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and I).  
After the conference, we called for papers for publication from the 
speakers and we accepted six papers for the special issue of Journal of 
Philosophy of Life. We would like to give special thanks to anonymous 
referees who kindly reviewed submitted manuscripts. The accepted papers 
deal with a variety of topics such as anti-natalism, ancient Chinese 
philosophy, Wittgenstein, bioethics, and solipsism, and are all discussed 
from the perspective of the philosophy of meaning in life. 
In 2019, we are going to hold the Second International Conference on 
Philosophy and Meaning in Life at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. We 
are planning to publish a collection of the presented papers in Journal of 
Philosophy of Life, Vol.10, to be published in 2020. 
As the editor-in-chief, I hope that readers will enjoy the stimulating 
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How Human Life Matters in the Universe 
A Reply to David Benatar  
Brooke Alan Trisel* 
 
Abstract 
In his book, The Human Predicament, David Benatar claims that our individual lives and human life, 
in general, do not make a difference beyond Earth and, therefore, are meaningless from the vast, 
cosmic perspective. In this paper, I will explain how what we do matters from the cosmic 
perspective. I will provide examples of how human beings have transcended our limits, thereby 
giving human life some meaning from the cosmic perspective. Also, I will argue that human life 
could become even more meaningful by making some fundamental achievements, such as 




Many philosophers have concluded that our individual lives can be 
meaningful even if God does not exist and death marks the permanent end of our 
existence. 1  David Benatar, in his thought-provoking book The Human 
Predicament, acknowledges that one’s life can be objectively meaningful from 
human-based perspectives. However, he contends that our individual lives and 
human life, in general, are meaningless from the cosmic perspective. “We are 
insignificant specks in a vast universe that is utterly indifferent to us,” Benatar 
writes.2 The “cosmic perspective,” as Benatar calls it, is also sometimes referred 
to in the literature as “the point of view of the universe,” “the view from 
nowhere,” “the view from everywhere,” and sub specie aeternitatis. 
I will seek to contribute to the literature by explaining how what we do 
matters from the cosmic perspective. There is a blossoming literature on what 
gives meaning to one’s individual life – a topic called “meaning in life.” In 
                                                     
* Independent scholar. Email: triselba[a]cs.com 
** An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First International Conference on Philosophy 
and Meaning in Life at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan on August 21, 2018. Thank you to the 
participants at the presentation for your questions and comments. Thanks also to an anonymous referee 
for helpful comments. 
1 See, for example, Metz (2013) and Landau (2017).  
2 Benatar (2017), p. 2.  
 2
contrast, scant attention has been given to the topic of “meaning of life.”3 There 
have been only a few attempts to explain how human life, in general, could be 
meaningful or significant4 from a cosmic and nonreligious perspective.5    
In section two, I will provide an overview of Benatar’s argument that life is 
meaningless from the cosmic perspective. In section three, I will explain how 
human life makes a difference beyond Earth and will argue that achievements 
are an extraordinary type of event that will stand out in cosmic history. In 
section four, I will point out some deficiencies of Benatar’s analysis. Also, I will 
provide examples of how human beings have transcended our limits, thereby 
giving some meaning to human life from the cosmic perspective. In section five, 
I will argue that human life could become even more meaningful by making 
some fundamental achievements, such as determining how life on Earth 
originated. Then, in section six, I will explain how one’s individual life could be 
meaningful from the cosmic perspective.  
 
2. An Overview of Benatar’s Argument 
  
Benatar begins his argument by asserting that attaining meaning is about 
“transcending limits.” “A meaningful life is one that transcends one’s own limits 
and significantly impacts others or serves purposes beyond oneself,” he writes.6 
As do other supporters of “objective naturalism,”7 including myself, Benatar 
believes that a person’s life could be meaningful (or meaningless) even if this 
person believes otherwise. Also, he argues that meaning comes in varying 
amounts such that a person’s life could be meaningless, somewhat meaningful, 
or meaningful. He contends that whether one’s life is meaningful can be 
assessed from different perspectives, including three human-based perspectives 
and the cosmic perspective. 
The human-based perspectives include the viewpoint of an individual, a 
                                                     
3 Most of the discussion about “meaning of life” continues to be from a religious perspective. See, for 
example, Mawson (2016) and Seachris and Goetz (2016). 
4 I will use the words “meaningful” and “significant” interchangeably. The difference in the meaning 
of these words, if any, is so slight that it is immaterial to this analysis.  
5 See Landau (2011) and Kahane (2014). I will discuss Landau’s view later in this paper. Kahane 
argues that humanity would be of great cosmic significance if there is no sentient life elsewhere in the 
universe. For discussion and criticism of this argument, see Benatar (2017), pp. 47-51, and Hughes 
(2017).   
6 Benatar (2017), p. 18.  
7 For an in-depth discussion of objective naturalism, see Metz (2013), pp. 180-239. 
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family or community, or all of humanity. From the perspective of an individual, 
Mary, for example, can make a sufficiently positive impact on the life of another 
person to give Mary’s life meaning. From the perspective of a small group of 
people, such as a family, one may play an important role in one’s family, perhaps 
as the primary caregiver, thereby giving one’s life meaning from this perspective. 
As the perspective expands from an individual to a small group to all of 
humanity, it becomes more difficult for one’s life to be meaningful from that 
larger perspective. Whereas the lives of many people are meaningful from the 
narrower perspectives of an individual or a small group of people, very few 
people have made a difference to all of humanity, Benatar argues. He mentions 
Albert Einstein, Alan Turing, and the Buddha as examples of individuals whose 
lives were meaningful from the “perspective of humanity.”  
The cosmic perspective is the broadest perspective. It encompasses times 
long before humanity emerged and long after humanity will go extinct. Of 
course, the universe, as a whole, does not literally have a perspective. However, 
we can imagine the view that an impartial observer would have if this observer 
could witness the entire universe unfold over time. Assessing human life from 
this broad, external viewpoint can help us assess, in an unbiased way, whether 
what we do matters beyond Earth.8  
Benatar, of course, is not the first philosopher to claim that human life is 
meaningless from the cosmic perspective. To give another example, Simon 
Blackburn writes: “To a witness with the whole of space and time in its view, 
nothing on a human scale will have meaning (it is hard to imagine how it could 
be visible at all – there is an awful lot of space and time out there).”9  
As support for his conclusion that human life is meaningless and that it 
would not have mattered if we had never come into existence, Benatar asserts 
that human life was not created for a reason and that we do not make a 
difference beyond Earth.10 We have some control over Earth, but have very little 
control over what happens beyond Earth.11 
James Tartaglia also argues that human life is meaningless, but he thinks this 
                                                     
8 I will not attempt to outline a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the cosmic perspective. 
When discussing this perspective, philosophers generally mention the vastness of time and space (i.e., 
temporal and spatial components). Recently, there has been debate about whether this perspective also 
includes modal and ontological components. See Seachris (2013) and Landau (2014).  
9 Blackburn (2001), p. 79.   
10 Benatar (2017), p. 50.  
11 Ibid., p. 51. Hughes (2017) makes a similar claim.  
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is just a “neutral fact.”12 In contrast, Benatar thinks that being cosmically 
insignificant would be terrible and that people are justified in being concerned 
that we do not make a difference beyond Earth.13   
Blackburn’s concern that what we do is invisible is a lesser concern than that 
life is meaningless because it might be unnecessary for our efforts to be visible 
for them to make a difference beyond Earth. Nonetheless, I will address both 
concerns in the next section.   
 
3. Making a Difference from the Cosmic Perspective 
  
Viewing our lives from the vast, cosmic perspective can make us feel tiny, 
fleeting, and, worse yet, inconsequential. It may seem as if we are stranded on 
an island, not knowing how we got here and what we should do with our lives. 
In this mysterious universe in which we find ourselves, we help each other, 
which is one way we give meaning to our individual lives from human-based 
perspectives. However, our efforts may seem isolated from, and inconsequential 
to, the rest of the universe. How, if at all, do our efforts matter beyond Earth?  
I concede to Benatar that human life was not created for a reason, such as to 
fulfill a purpose of nature or a god, and that we have very little control over the 
rest of the universe. However, we make a difference from the cosmic perspective 
in another way. By engaging in inherently worthwhile pursuits, such as making 
moral, intellectual, and artistic achievements, it adds intrinsic value to the 
universe and gives meaning to our individual lives and to human life, in general. 
One might agree that this can add meaning to one’s individual life, but then 
wonder how this would add meaning to humanity.  
There are two ways of thinking about “humanity.” Humanity can be thought 
of holistically, as one, or, individualistically, as the many human beings that 
make up the whole.14 If we think of humanity holistically, as I suspect most 
people do, it becomes difficult to see how humanity could be meaningful 
because human life was not created for a reason, and the billions of human 
beings dispersed across Earth do not have an overarching goal(s) that we are 
cooperatively pursuing. In fact, some people have conflicting goals.  
Alternatively, if we think of humanity individualistically, as many human 
                                                     
12 Tartaglia (2016), p. ix. I reply to Tartaglia in Trisel (2017).  
13 Benatar (2017), pp. 36, 51-62. 
14 For more discussion, see Trisel (2016), pp. 7-12 and (2017), pp. 168-172.  
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beings, it reveals a way that humanity could become meaningful. Although 
individuals pursue diverse goals, if meaning is something that aggregates across 
human beings, then by adding meaning to our individual lives, we would 
thereby also be adding meaning to humanity. Through our individual efforts, we 
would be giving humanity meaning from the “bottom-up.” A brick wall is 
constructed from the ground, brick by brick. Similarly, individual human beings 
are the foundation of humanity. One by one, as more individual lives become 
meaningful, humanity, in turn, would become more meaningful.   
Making achievements is one source of meaning in our lives, as many 
philosophers have argued.15 Achievements create a product and result from a 
structured process, as Gwen Bradford argues.16 Achievements do not happen by 
accident. They require thought, planning, skill, and determination. One feature 
of great achievements is that they are difficult to make.17  
Achievements are intrinsically valuable, meaning that they are valuable “in 
and of themselves,” and may also be instrumentally valuable in helping other 
people or non-human animals. Bradford convincingly argues that the overall 
value of an achievement is determined by: (1) the degree of effort and rationality 
exercised by the individual(s) who made the achievement and (2) the amount of 
intrinsic and instrumental value that results from the product of the 
achievement.18 For example, washing one’s car, which requires minimal effort 
and thought, is a far less valuable achievement than the formulation of the 
theory of relativity by Albert Einstein, which required a high degree of 
prolonged effort. 
Because we are tiny beings on a small planet in this immense universe, 
Blackburn doubts whether what we do is even visible from the cosmic 
perspective. Achievements are a type of event that will stand out from this 
perspective. From human-based perspectives, we take achievements for granted, 
which occurs because nearly every human being makes at least some minor 
achievements, and the products from some achievements, such as the airplane 
and computer, have become assimilated into our everyday lives. However, by 
expanding our perspective beyond humanity to include the rest of the universe, 
it reveals that achievements are an extraordinary type of event insofar as they are 
                                                     
15 See, for example, Bradford (2015), p, 2. 
16 Bradford (2015), p. 11.  
17 Ibid., pp. 12, 26-63. 
18 Ibid., pp. 187-188.  
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intrinsically valuable, planned, and are only made by rational beings. 
Human beings have made many great achievements, including creating 
language, music, and the United Nations. When compared to all of the other 
events in cosmic history, such as the collision of subatomic particles and the 
implosion of stars, human achievements are a miniscule proportion of all events. 
Nonetheless, because achievements are an extraordinary type of event, they will 
stand out from all other events in the universe. It is true, as Blackburn indicates, 
that there is an “awful lot of space and time out there.”19 Although the universe 
contains trillions of inanimate, physical objects, such as electrons and stars, not 
one of them will ever make an achievement. Indeed, if Earth is the only planet 
that harbors intelligent life, then the only achievements that have occurred in 
this universe would be on or near Earth.  
 
4. Transcending Achievements 
  
As argued, human life has made a difference by adding intrinsic value to the 
universe, which has given human life some meaning from the cosmic 
perspective. Because achievements are an extraordinary type of event, they will 
stand out from all other events in cosmic history. In response, a skeptic might 
argue that the achievements I mentioned (creating language, music, and the 
United Nations) do not transcend our limits and, therefore, might not be of great 
value from the cosmic perspective.  
As will be discussed in this section, human beings have also made some 
achievements that have transcended our limits – what I will refer to as 
“transcending achievements.” During the last 300 years, through creativity, 
determination, technological innovation, and scientific experimentation, human 
beings have made some transcending achievements. As the difficulty of making 
an achievement increases, the value that results from that achievement tends to 
increase, as discussed earlier. Thus, transcending achievements, which are 
extremely difficult to make, add substantial value to the universe.  
In the 13.772-billion-year history of the universe, modern day humans 
(Homo sapiens) emerged very recently – approximately 200,000 years ago. 
Consequently, the “perspective of humanity,” as Benatar calls it, is a recent and 
narrow perspective that extends from 200,000 years ago to the eventual 
                                                     
19 Blackburn (2001), p. 79. 
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extinction of human life. 
As you recall, Benatar argues that meaning is about “transcending limits.”20 
However, he does not assess whether humanity has transcended its limits.  This 
is a serious deficiency with his analysis, given that he endorses the 
transcendence theory of meaning.21 If meaning is accrued by transcending 
limits, but Benatar does not assess whether humanity has transcended its limits, 
then how can Benatar know that human life is meaningless? To be fair, Benatar 
does give some consideration to whether we make a difference beyond Earth, 
but he does not consider whether we have transcended our limits.  
In what follows, I will provide some examples of how humanity has 
transcended its limits – limits that are reflected in the narrow “perspective of 
humanity.” Many of our distant ancestors believed that Earth was created 6,000 
years ago. Through the study of geology and astronomy, we now know that 
Earth existed for more than 4 billion years before modern day humans emerged. 
And Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection explains how simpler 
life-forms evolved, over millions of years, into various human species, which 
evolved into Homo sapiens.  
Benatar bemoans that we have very little control over other parts of the 
universe, but it is unclear why he thinks we need this control. He seems to see 
this as a way of “making a difference” to the rest of the universe. However, 
without knowing what we would do if we had this control, it is unclear how this 
would make a difference. Having more control over other parts of the universe 
has proven to be unnecessary for us to explore and learn about the universe. For 
example, Isaac Newton set forth his famous three laws of motion without 
traveling to, or controlling, other parts of the universe. Because Newton’s laws 
of motion apply throughout the universe, they exemplify an achievement that 
transcended the “perspective of humanity.”   
The invention of the telescope to explore the universe is another example of 
a transcending achievement. In 1929, using the telescope, the astronomer Edwin 
Hubble made the remarkable discovery that distant galaxies are moving away 
from us rapidly, which suggested that the universe is expanding. In 1990, a 
telescope named in honor of Hubble – the “Hubble Space Telescope” – was 
launched into orbit around Earth.  
Although we cannot travel to far away planets or back in time, it is 
                                                     
20 Benatar (2017), p. 18.  
21 For more discussion of this theory of meaning, see Metz (2013), pp. 28-30.  
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unnecessary to do this to learn about the universe because light waves, emitted 
long ago, travel to us22 and these waves reveal some of cosmic history. The 
Hubble Space Telescope, a sort of time machine, captures these images of the 
early universe, thereby allowing us to observe what happened billions of years 
ago. This telescope has led to many important discoveries, 23  including 
providing data for scientists to develop a more precise estimate of when the 
universe originated (13.772 billion years ago).  
In 1990, with ground-based telescopes, we could visualize distant galaxies, 
as they were six billion years after the Big Bang. By 2010, after some 
enhancements to the Hubble Space Telescope, we could look much further back 
in time and observe distant galaxies 480 million years after the universe 
originated.24 As I have sought to demonstrate, through the development and use 
of technology, human beings have transcended the recent and narrow 
“perspective of humanity” by an astounding 13 billion years,25 thereby giving 
human life some meaning from the cosmic perspective. 
By utilizing telescopes, it has allowed us to transcend our limits and explore 
that which is extremely large – planets, stars, and galaxies. We have also 
transcended our limits by exploring that which is extremely small – subatomic 
particles. Particle accelerators, such as the Large Hadron Collider, are being 
used to test theories about the structure and dynamics of the subatomic world 
and to advance our understanding of how quantum physics relates to the general 
theory of relativity.  
Would an impartial observer, with a view of everything, agree with Benatar 
that human life is meaningless? I do not think so. By observing that 
achievements are an extraordinary type of event in the universe, and that human 
beings have made some transcending achievements that have added substantial 
value to the universe, an impartial observer would conclude that human life is 
somewhat meaningful from the cosmic perspective.  
A skeptic might reply, as an anonymous referee did, that “Our knowledge of 
the cosmos is not the same as our mattering from the cosmic perspective.” I am 
not suggesting that merely possessing knowledge of the cosmos is sufficient to 
give human life meaning from the cosmic perspective. If that were true, then 
                                                     
22 Light travels outward from its source in all directions.  
23 See NASA (2017).   
24 NASA (2011). 
25 This figure was calculated by comparing when Homo sapiens emerged (200,000 years ago) to how 
far back in time we have been able to look with the Hubble Space Telescope (13.29 billion years ago).  
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humanity would be meaningful if an extraterrestrial life-form had formulated 
the laws of motion and the general theory of relativity and then passed this 
knowledge on to us. What makes human life somewhat meaningful from the 
cosmic perspective is that human beings made some extremely difficult to make 
achievements that transcended the narrow “perspective of humanity” and 
resulted in highly valuable products.  
  
5. Fundamental Achievements 
  
As discussed in the prior section, human beings have made some 
transcending achievements, such as estimating when the universe originated. 
However, we have not yet answered the fundamental questions of how the 
universe and life on Earth originated. By answering these questions, which I will 
refer to as “fundamental achievements,” it would add substantial meaning to 
human life.  
There are other achievements that would qualify as fundamental 
achievements. However, for the sake of brevity, I will focus on the two examples 
mentioned above. In what follows, I will first provide some background on the 
searches for how the universe and life originated. Then, I will explain why these 
particular achievements would add substantial meaning to human life.   
Hubble’s observation that the universe is expanding led astrophysicists to 
hypothesize that all of the matter and energy in the universe were once 
compacted into an infinitesimally small volume, which erupted and is otherwise 
known as the “Big Bang.” The Big Bang theory continues to be the leading 
explanation for how the universe originated. However, in recent years, some 
scientists have become concerned with some parts of the theory.26 Consequently, 
there is more work to be done to determine how the universe originated.   
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection explains how life evolved 
on Earth, but it does not address the fundamental question of how life on Earth 
originated. At first glance, this question might not appear to transcend the 
perspective of what happens on Earth. However, origin-of-life researchers 
approach this question from the broader cosmic perspective for two reasons. 
First, in thinking about how life could have originated, and when the necessary 
conditions would have been in place for this to occur, they take into account 
                                                     
26 For further discussion, see Rhook and Zangari (1994). 
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what astronomers have learned about the age and evolution of the universe and 
Earth.27 Second, some scientists have hypothesized that microbial life, or at 
least the building blocks of life, might have originated beyond Earth and then 
were later transferred to Earth by meteorites, comets, or interplanetary dust 
particles.28  
Other prominent theories for how life on Earth originated include the 
“prebiotic soup theory,” where organic compounds necessary for the creation of 
life were generated from the interaction between sunlight and lightning in the 
early atmosphere. Alternatively, life might have originated in deep-sea 
hydrothermal systems.29  
Bradford reflects on the question “what would be the most valuable 
achievements overall?”30 She argues that the most valuable achievements will 
be extremely difficult to make, will involve an excellent exercise of rationality, 
and will have supremely valuable products. As I will explain, determining how 
the universe and life on Earth originated meet these criteria.   
Because of the vast size and age of the universe, and because things in the 
universe are continually changing, which can thereby wipe out clues that would 
help us answer fundamental questions, it would be extremely difficult for human 
beings, or any other life-form, to determine how the universe and life originated. 
When something is extremely difficult, this can be demotivating to some people 
and motivating to others. We should not let this difficulty discourage us. This 
difficulty is a large part of why answering these questions would add substantial 
meaning to human life (or to an extraterrestrial life-form that answers these 
questions).    
If there is intelligent life on other planets, they might not be interested in 
learning about topics that human beings pursue from the “perspective of 
humanity,” such as anthropology. However, they undoubtedly would be 
interested in the fundamental, existential questions. They would want to know 
how they and the universe originated. They would also want to know how life 
on Earth originated because this might provide them with insight regarding how 
life on their planet originated.31 Life on different planets might have originated 
                                                     
27 For a historical and scientific overview of the question of how life on Earth originated, see Fry 
(2000).  
28 See Fry (2000), pp. 61-62, 131-134 and Kitadai and Maruyama (2017), pp. 4-5.  
29 Kitadai and Maruyama (2017), pp. 3-4.  
30 Bradford (2015), p. 188.  
31 One of the primary reasons that scientists search for life beyond Earth is because it may provide 
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from the same or a very similar process. Thus, these questions about our origins 
are universal insofar as all intelligent life-forms will have these questions. If it 
turns out that life exists only on Earth, and we determine how life on Earth 
originated, then we would thereby also be explaining how life originated in the 
universe. 
Answering the fundamental questions of how did the universe and life 
originate would “make a difference” by adding substantial intrinsic value to the 
universe and satisfying our longstanding desire to know about our origins. 
Furthermore, if there is intelligent life elsewhere, these achievements would 
likely be instrumentally valuable to these other life-forms, in terms of satisfying 
their curiosity or helping them deal with existential anguish – assuming, of 
course, that they become aware of these achievements.     
If we make a fundamental achievement, but no one other than human beings 
know that this occurred, this might be of little consolation to those individuals 
who are concerned that human beings make no difference beyond Earth. 
However, we should distinguish between “making a difference” and having that 
difference recognized and appreciated. It would be true that we made a 
difference even if the rest of the universe was unaware that it occurred.  
 
6. How One’s Individual Life Can be Meaningful from the Cosmic 
Perspective 
  
I will now turn to the question of whether one’s individual life can be 
meaningful from the cosmic perspective. Iddo Landau has responded to this 
question. He begins by making an important distinction between perspectives 
for viewing our lives and standards for judging whether or not our lives are 
meaningful. He argues that assessing our lives from the cosmic perspective need 
not render them meaningless, as long as we use reasonable standards for this 
evaluation.  
Some philosophers use a standard of perfection to judge whether life is 
meaningful. They argue that our individual lives and human life, in general, are 
ultimately meaningless in the absence of God and personal immortality.32 In 
contrast, Landau argues that “one may be taken to have had a meaningful life, if, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
insight into how life on Earth originated. For further discussion, see Davies (2010), p. 205.  
32 Supernaturalist theories of meaning reflect the desire for perfection, as Metz (2013, pp. 132-133, 
137-138) has convincingly argued. 
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for instance, one achieved some deep understanding, happiness, or artistic 
accomplishment that did not affect anyone else.” This is true, he argues, from an 
individual perspective and from the cosmic perspective.33  
As support for this argument, he points out that according to some religions, 
God – who is thought to have a view of everything – may judge an action (such 
as helping another person) to be meaningful even if that action has only a very 
limited effect. In response, Benatar suggests that the reason the action with the 
very limited effect seems meaningful is because Landau is imagining that God is 
viewing it from a local perspective, not from the broader cosmic perspective.34 I 
disagree. It is clear that many Christians believe that God has a view of 
everything, through the powers of omniscience and omnipresence, and that, 
from this view, he judges some human actions with very limited effects to be 
meaningful.  
After providing his religious based example, Landau then asserts that an 
action with a very limited effect can also be meaningful in a Godless universe. 
However, the scenario in which a small action is meaningful according to 
Christian teachings is much different from the scenario in which a small action 
occurs in a Godless universe, as I will explain.   
If human life had been created by God to fulfill a purpose, and a person 
successfully carried out his or her role, we assume that God would judge that 
this person’s actions were meaningful, even if God had given this person only a 
small role. A small action and effect by a person might help God fulfill his plan, 
thereby “making a difference” and giving this person’s action some meaning 
from the cosmic perspective. This is the reason why the religious based example 
provides support for Landau’s argument that a small action can be meaningful 
from the cosmic perspective.  
But if God does not exist, how would a small action by a person make a 
difference to the rest of the universe beyond Earth? For Landau’s argument to be 
convincing, it must address this crucial question, which I will attempt to do.  
A small action by a human being can make a difference beyond Earth by 
adding intrinsic value to the universe. If that action were never performed, then 
the universe would have less value than it does. Adding value to the universe is 
how human beings can make a difference from the cosmic perspective and how 
                                                     
33 Landau (2011), pp. 729-730. See also Landau (2017), pp. 93-99. For a response, see Seachris 
(2013).  
34 Benatar (2017), p. 223, n. 40.  
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a small action can be meaningful, even when viewed from the cosmic 
perspective.  
Whether an individual’s whole life will be meaningful from the cosmic 
perspective will depend on how much intrinsic value this person contributes to 
the universe. If a person makes an artistic accomplishment that does not affect 
anyone else, this would add some value to the universe, but it seems doubtful 
that it would be sufficient to make this person’s whole life meaningful from the 
cosmic perspective. In contrast, the development of the theory of relativity by 
Einstein was a pioneering and influential achievement that transcended the 
“perspective of humanity” and resulted in a very valuable product. Consequently, 
Einstein’s transcending achievements would have added substantial intrinsic 





Some people are satisfied knowing that their individual lives can be 
meaningful from human-based perspectives. Other people seek more than this. 
They want their lives and human life, in general, to matter from the cosmic 
perspective. As argued in this paper, our efforts matter and not just to each other. 
They also matter from the cosmic perspective in the following way. By engaging 
in inherently worthwhile pursuits, it adds intrinsic value to the universe and 
gives meaning to our individual lives. And, if meaning aggregates across human 
beings, then the meaning that we give to our individual lives also gives meaning 
to humanity.  
It is my hope that this paper will encourage others to reflect on life’s 
meaning from the cosmic perspective. Although viewing our lives from the 
cosmic perspective starkly reveals our limitations and can be intimidating, it can 
also show how some events that we take for granted from human-based 
perspectives are special and valuable in the universe. For example, it revealed 
that achievements are an extraordinary type of event.  
Human beings have made many achievements, including some transcending 
achievements. By continuing to transcend our limits, and answering 
fundamental questions about our origins, it would stand out in cosmic history, 
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The ‘Subjective Attraction’ and ‘Objective Attractiveness’ of 
the Practice of the Rites in the Xunzi 
Angel On Ki Ting* 
 
Abstract 
Xunzi is well-known for his claim that “human nature is evil (e 惡)” and that the rites (li 禮) are 
established to bring order to a society. Most research on Xunzi has thus focused on how the 
transformation of human nature (hua xing qi wei 化性起偽) is possible and the role of the rites in 
the development of a moral agent. However, what has not been explored is the extent to which the 
practice of the rites contributes to a meaningful life that is comparable to some Western conceptions 
of meaningfulness. Through surveying the conception of meaningfulness given by Susan Wolf, this 
paper aims to show that the practice of the rites in the Xunzi has both objective and subjective 
values that are necessary for rendering a life meaningful. Furthermore, the practice of the rites 
resolves the tension that arises in contemporary Western discussions of meaningfulness regarding 






Albert Camus starts his Myth of Sisyphus dealing with what he thinks is the 
most urgent of all philosophical problems—suicide, for if one judges life to have 
no significance, then nothing else matters. 1  In response to this urgency, 
contemporary philosophers have come up with various approaches to address the 
issue of meaning in life, including both supernaturalism and naturalism.2 While 
supernaturalism rests the meaning of life on a supernatural being such as God, 
naturalism suggests that human beings can have a meaningful life without 
assuming the existence of any supernatural entity. The naturalist approach can be 
further divided into two main branches, subjectivism and objectivism, which are 
mainly distinguished based on the issue of whether an objective standard, rather 
than one’s subjective desires, is necessary for a life to be meaningful. During such 
discussions, there arises a tension between living a moral life and satisfying one’s 
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1 Camus (2005), p. 1-2. 
2 For a detailed survey on different approaches addressing the meaning of life suggested by 
contemporary philosophers, see Metz (2001, 2002, 2015).  
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self-interests; as such, Susan Wolf puts forward an approach that combines both 
subjective and objective values. The quest for a meaningful life in the 
contemporary Western tradition, as suggested by Thaddeus Metz, is a quest for “a 
significant existence”—not only does this quest of meaningfulness seek the value 
of life, but the solution to this quest also suggests how people should live in this 
world, in contrast to living a happy and moral life.3 
Although early Confucians (Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi) lacked a 
systematic analysis of the conception of meaningful life, it is undeniable that 
they were concerned with how one should orient oneself in a chaotic world in 
order to live a good life. Richard Kim and Joshua W. Seachris suggest that 
Confucius’s emphasis on rituals [the rites] (li 禮) and the value of family allows 
one to live a meaningful life with purpose and significance.4 Apart from 
encouraging a sense of purpose and significance, I suggest that the practice of 
the rites and the value of family as expressed in the Xunzi also provides people 
guidance as to how one should live in this world, and it is in this sense that the 
practice of the rites contributes meaning to one’s life. Xunzi is of particular 
interest in this paper because of his views towards human nature (xing 性). On the 
one hand, he contends that human beings are born with various desires and are 
driven to satisfy their own interests, without regard for public interest. On the 
other hand, he argues that everyone is capable of becoming a moral agent living 
harmoniously in society through learning and practicing the rites. This 
seemingly contrasting view towards human nature can be viewed as representing 
the contrasting views of subjectivism and objectivism. With the help of the 
conception of meaningfulness given by Susan Wolf, this paper aims to show that 
the practice of the rites in the Xunzi may shed some light on how to reconcile the 
tensions between morality and self-interest, and allow one to live a meaningful 
life.  
 
2. Susan Wolf on “Subjective Attraction” and “Objective Attractiveness”  
 
Although the subjectivist and objectivist approaches are prominent in 
Western contemporary discussions of the meaning of (and in) life, Susan Wolf 
finds both of them inadequate. The subjectivist approach focuses on the 
satisfaction of self-interest, and claims that one’s life is meaningful provided that 
                                                     
3 Metz (2001), p. 138. 
4 Kim and Seachris (2018), p. 1-9. 
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one is pursuing what interests them; as Metz puts it, “subjectivism maintains that 
what is meaningful for a given person is a function of that toward which she (or 
her group) has (or would have) a certain pro-attitude”.5 This conception of 
meaningfulness is well represented by a picture of the passionate Sisyphus 
suggested by Richard Taylor. According to the myth of Sisyphus, Sisyphus was 
punished by God and forced to roll a boulder up to the top of a hill. When he had 
almost finished the job, the stone would roll down, and Sisyphus had to start 
rolling the boulder up from the bottom of the hill again and again, for all eternity, 
without any aim. Many would agree with Taylor that Sisyphus’s toil is a paradigm 
of an objectively meaningless life—a picture of “endless pointlessness”. 6 
Nonetheless, if this picture of Sisyphus represents the condition of human 
existence, is it possible for human beings to find subjective value in their 
existence? Taylor concludes that if Sisyphus found “inflicted on him the irrational 
desire to be doing just what he found himself doing,” then his life would be 
meaningful, despite the fact he is not going to achieve anything with objective 
value.7 Taylor dismisses the need for objective value in a meaningful life, for 
pursuing goals with objective value would result in the “Paradox of the End,” as 
illustrated by Iddo Landau:  
 
We set ourselves ends and strive to achieve them. We hope that their 
attainment will improve our condition. The closer we get to our goals, the 
happier we feel. Paradoxically, however, when we finally do achieve them 
our joy is sometimes diminished. We have a sense of insignificance and 
emptiness, and we feel that in attaining our goal we have lost the 
meaningfulness and balance we experienced while we were striving 
towards it. In some ways, it seems to us, the struggle is more gratifying than 
the achievement of the end.8 
 
Even if the goals that Sisyphus pursues have objective value, if he pursues one 
goal after another, it would be no different from his punishment as he is still 
endlessly and aimlessly pursuing different goals. If we are to find meaning in the 
life of a Sisyphus who is keen on pursuing goals, it will be in his will to pursue his 
                                                     
5 Metz (2001), p. 139. 
6 Taylor (2000), p. 325. 
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goals and his struggle to achieve something significant, rather than the 
significance of the goals themselves. In other words, it is his pro-attitude that 
makes his life meaningful, rather than the objective value.  
Wolf finds it indisputable that having passion, or finding fulfilment in what 
one is doing, is necessary for a life to be meaningful. It is not difficult to find 
people who do not enjoy their life and thus conclude that life is meaningless, such 
as the alienated housewives mentioned by Peter Singer in his book How Are We to 
Live?.9 Nonetheless, Wolf points out that Taylor’s view on meaningfulness would 
lead to an absurd consequence. What if someone finds passion in “counting or 
recounting the number of tiles on the bathroom floor”?10 According to Taylor’s 
conception, that person would have a meaningful life as long as they find the 
activity fulfilling; however, this does not seem to fit our common conception of 
meaningfulness. In fact, Wolf suggests that that person may be mistaken in their 
belief in what counts as meaningful.   
However, a life dedicated to pursing only objective value, and moral value in 
particular, may be undesirable as well. In her article entitled “Moral Saints,” Wolf 
argues that the life of moral saints, whether deontological or utilitarian, are 
unattractive. These people would devote themselves to categorical duties or 
maximizing happiness while neglecting their own interests. They may not be able 
to enjoy non-moral interests (such as reading and playing violin), nor could they 
develop their non-moral talents (such as athletic talents and musical talents), for 
practical reasons. Given their dominating moral characters, they would require 
themselves to be fully dedicated to their moral duties and thereby disregard any 
non-moral characters and activities. Even if they allowed themselves to enjoy 
those activities, such pursuits would only be seen as instrumental in achieving 
their moral duties. More significantly, these non-moral interests, talents and 
characters are essential components of our identity, and suppressing them may 
result in the loss of personal self.11 In sum, the life of moral saints would be 
“strangely barren”.12  
Although Wolf argues that an objective value is necessary (unlike other 
scholars such as Peter Singer, who defines objective value as something “larger 
than the self”),13 she nonetheless leaves its definition opaque. Singer argues that it 
                                                     
9 Wolf (2013), p. 306. 
10 Wolf (1997), p. 218-219. 
11 Wolf (1982), p. 420-424. 
12 Ibid., p. 421. 
13 Singer (1995), p. 213. 
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is only through living for purposes larger than oneself that one can avoid the 
undesirable results that arise from living with only subjective value—emptiness 
and dissatisfaction. For those who live with only subjective value, the validation 
of value always comes from within oneself, so one could never know whether one 
is doing something significant. Eventually, one would come to doubt why one 
wanted to pursue any activity in the first place and find oneself trapped in a 
vicious circle. It is through participating in something with objective value that 
one can avoid begging the question and find justification for continuing to engage 
in their activities.14  
However, despite the fact that objective value could help to break the vicious 
circle, and no matter how significant one’s impact is in this world, the existence of 
human beings is still insignificant from the perspective of the universe. Sooner or 
later, the universe will be destroyed and no conscious beings will be left to 
appreciate the significance of human existence. Singer’s view thus exposes a 
problem in discussions of the meaning of life, where a life that is (ethically) 
objectively meaningful may still be objectively meaningless from the perspective 
of the universe.15  
In this respect, the opaque meaning of objective value given by Susan Wolf 
helps to solve this problem. Wolf believes it is of importance to include 
objectivity in the conception of a meaningful life as a solution for reconciling the 
discrepancy between the perspective of the universe and that of individuals. If one 
believes that one's interests are the only important things within one's life and 
strives only for one's own satisfaction, one would be devastated to learn the fact 
that the universe is indifferent to one's interests, and that there is no point in 
striving towards any achievement since we will all die one day. As it is one's 
solipsistic attitude that causes this discordance when one is confronted with the 
perspective of the universe, Wolf thus emphasises the importance of harmonising 
these perspectives. To adopt an objective value is to recognise the fact that there 
exist other perspectives beyond one's own. More importantly, these other 
perspectives are as equally important as one's own and might be “indifferent to 
whether one exists at all”.16  Through acknowledging the existence of these 
perspectives, one realises “the fact that one is not the center of the universe”,17 
                                                     
14 Ibid., p.206-213. 
15 For a more detailed explanation of different perspectives of meaningfulness, see Benatar (2017). 
16 Wolf (2013), p. 312. 
17 Ibid. 
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which aligns with the perspective of the universe and enables one to carry on with 
one's life. To Wolf, this facet of an objective value in the conception of 
meaningfulness means more to an individual than leaving an impact on the world. 
If we emphasise the perspective of the universe in discussing the meaning of 
life, we eventually come to the conclusion that all activities are equally 
meaningful as long as it is one’s will to pursue them, for nothing really matters to 
the universe. This subjectivist interpretation of meaningfulness is so broad that it 
would include lives that are generally regarded as meaningless, such as the lives 
of people who are passionate about doing crossword puzzles, or counting the 
number of tiles on the bathroom floor.18 Nonetheless, if we give priority to 
objective value, one’s self-interest in living a good life may be neglected. Wolf's 
conception of meaningfulness is of significance in that it allows us to live a good 
life, while at the same time reminding us of the importance of objectivity. It is the 
synthesis of both subjectivist and objectivist points of view. The implication is 
that the kinds of activities one engages in are not important unless they cultivate a 
sense of objectivity, such that people are prevented from being self-centred. As 
such, meaningful lives can involve individuals living harmoniously with others 
within a community, and activities that render lives meaningful can be those that 
cultivate the virtues necessary for a person to successfully engage in social 
relationships. With this conception of meaningfulness, I will look into the practice 
of the rites advocated by Xunzi, and show that participating in the practice of the 
rites contributes to a meaningful life. 
 
3. An Account of Meaningful Life in the Xunzi 
 
Instead of asking why human beings exist in this world, Xunzi was more 
concerned with how one ought to live in this world, a concern that aligns with the 
conception of meaningfulness from the perspective of individuals. For Xunzi, this 
question amounts to how to be a virtuous person and establish a harmonious 
society in response to the human condition. Xunzi contends that there are certain 
facts about human beings and that we must respond to them in order to flourish. 
First and foremost, human beings are social animals that must live within a 
society. Furthermore, they are born with various desires and are driven to satisfy 
them. However, if human beings are allowed to pursue their desires to satisfaction 
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without limit, neither their desires nor the society’s resources can be sustained. 
Moreover, Xunzi asserts that although human beings are born with the potential to 
learn to be moral, they are not born with incipient moral capacities and thus they 
must learn to become moral agents—human nature can be beautified. In response 
to these facts, social conventions (known as the rites) are thus established to 
ensure the proper allocation of resources and to guide human beings to become 
virtuous. It is only when a harmonious society is established and human nature is 
refined through joyous practice of the rites that human beings are able to flourish. 
The “objective attractiveness” of practicing the rites thus lies in its contribution to 
the organization of a functional, wealthy and harmonious society, as well as the 
beautification of human nature. Through the practice, one is not only attending to 
one’s own interests, but also at the same time orienting oneself to perspectives 
that are as equally important as one’s own. At the same time, its “subjective 
attraction” lies in the joy found in performing the rites. 
One way to establish a functional, wealthy and harmonious society is to 
install a hierarchical social institution through assigning proper stations to people 
according to their capacities and abilities. Xunzi asserts that all human beings, 
whether they are noble or not, are born with various desires and are driven to 
satisfy them.19 For instance, people desire food when hungry, warmth when cold, 
and rest when tired. They also desire not to be harmed, and seek out profit or 
self-interests (Knoblock, 4.9).20 Furthermore, they are distinguished from other 
animals in that they are able to form societies and utilise myriad things. 
Nonetheless, once they start to live together, they fight each other over limited 
resources, and disorder results (Knoblock, 9.16a; 10.1; 10.4; 19.1a; 23.1a). The 
rites are thus established in response to these facts about humanity and prescribe a 
hierarchical system within a society. As Xunzi notes, it is impossible for every 
person within the same society to be equal in power and influence, otherwise the 
society would not be functional. If everyone was the ruler, then there would be no 
officials to carry out their commands. By the same token, it is impossible for 
everyone to work in the same profession (Knoblock, 4.12; 9.3; 9.15; 10.4). A 
person who is fit to be a farmer may not do well as the director of the fields, and 
the same is true for other positions (Knoblock, 21.6b). It is thus of importance to 
divide people into different professions and social classes according to their 
                                                     
19 It should be noted that the word “noble” here refers to people who are virtuous, rather than a social 
class. The Chinese term for “noble person’” is 君子 (junzi). 
20 Unless otherwise stated, all citations of Xunzi are taken from Knoblock (1988).   
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abilities, age and virtues.  
This hierarchical system also defines the responsibilities of each position to 
ensure that each person performs their duties accordingly, where the lord acts as a 
lord, and farmers act as farmers (Knoblock, 4.12; 9.15). Once a social hierarchy 
has been established, resources can be allocated according to the various positions 
and emoluments. Lower officials should only use resources that are assigned to 
their positions, and they should not desire that which is not assigned to their 
positions, nor should they desire more than prescribed by their social 
status—otherwise, chaos would result and society could not prosper (Knoblock, 
10.1). In this sense, the rites also prescribe the proper objects of desire (Knoblock, 
19.1b). To summarise, through assigning proper stations to each person within a 
society and allocating resources accordingly, the rites lay down the foundation for 
a functional and affluent society. More importantly, people with different talents 
are able to flourish within this society. Through practicing the rites, one is not 
only able to satisfy their own interests, but also contribute to the moral order 
within a society that enables others to flourish.21  
Once a society is formed, human beings engage in various relations, such as 
the relations between lord and minister, parents and children, husbands and wives, 
and amongst siblings and friends. As long as a person is engaged in a human 
relation, one assumes the duties specified by that relation (Knoblock, 9.15). At the 
same time, one is required to possess certain virtues in order to perform these 
duties properly. For instance, being a minister is to serve one’s lord, which 
requires respect and loyalty; being a child is to carry out filial obligations as 
required by the parent-child relation, of which filial piety is necessary. It is 
through the practice of the rites that the virtues of respect, loyalty and filial piety 
as such are cultivated.  
Take the general principles of mourning as an example. First and foremost, 
                                                     
21 The social hierarchical system thus established is a just system, though not in the sense of the 
Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness, where everyone should be allowed to have equal 
opportunities despite the social positions they are born in. The aim of this hierarchical system is instead 
to sustain both the production of resources and the satisfaction of desires through securing a division of 
labour within a society. The inauguration of social classes is not arbitrary, but must be done using the 
capacity of righteousness (I 義), which is unique to human beings. According to Xunzi, if the classes 
are divided with the capacity of righteousness, a harmonious society can be achieved and resources can 
be utilised properly (Knoblock, 9.16a). Furthermore, as Antonio Cua (2003) points out, Xunzi is well 
aware of two different kinds of “honors”—the honor gained because of the virtues one possesses, and 
the honor gained by virtue of the social class one is born in (147–202). It is the honor gained through 
being a virtuous person that is of significance, and positions of higher officials should be held by 
virtuous persons.  
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the mourning rites define various human relationships. In the case of the extreme 
pain and grief that results from the death of one’s lord or parents, the mourning 
period is extended to three years so as to ensure enough time is given for the 
mourner to express their pain and grief. In contrast, the periods of mourning for 
other relations last no more than nine months. Through the distinction in the 
mourning period among various relations, the obligations accompanying the 
relations are thus defined (Knoblock, 19.5b, 19.9a; 19.9c; 19.10). Mourning in 
accordance with the rites is to perform one last duty to the deceased, so that one's 
respect to one’s lord or one's honour to one’s parent is expressed without 
reservation, which in turn requires the demonstration of virtues (the minister’s 
loyalty to the lord and the child’s filial piety to their parent) (Knoblock, 19.4a). 
Virtues such as loyalty, faithfulness, love and reverence are cultivated and 
expressed to the highest through the sacrifices employed in the mourning rites 
(Knoblock, 19.11). The funeral also brings together the feudal lords and 
government officials (in the case of the emperor) and distant relatives (in the case 
of an ordinary person). Given the amount of time required for the preparation of 
the funeral, even those who live far away are able to attend the funeral to show 
their loyalty and respect (Knoblock, 19.4b-c). Last but not least, since the proper 
expression of emotions in various situations is a sign that one is observing one’s 
duties as required by a particular relation, the rites also prescribe how and what 
kind of emotions one should express as required by the situation. For instance, the 
funeral rites prescribe how the deceased should be adorned to ensure the proper 
expression of emotions. If the deceased is not adorned properly, no grief can be 
expressed; this implies that one is not performing one’s duty as a child properly 
and that one is not showing respect and love towards one’s parent (Knoblock, 
19.5a). The rites are therefore important in maintaining human relations: 
practicing them not only defines various human relations and the duties that flow 
from such relations, but also cultivates virtues that are necessary for performing 
those duties and provides a proper means for people to express their emotions 
properly. In sum, through such practice, one does not only satisfy one’s 
self-interest, but also eventually becomes a virtuous person. 
Because they install social institutions and prescribe the proper expression of 
emotions through defining human relations, the rites are said to be able to beautify 
human nature. Xunzi’s assertion that human nature is evil is made in response to 
Mencius’s claim that humans are born with innate incipient moral capacities—the 
four moral sprouts. For Xunzi, human nature refers to capacities that humans are 
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born with and can be exercised without learning, such as the capacities of seeing 
and hearing, as well as the desire for profits and pleasure. Moral acts, by contrast, 
are acquired through conscious exertion (wei 偽 ). Xunzi draws an analogy 
between a warped board and human nature. Human effort such as press-framing, 
steaming and force must be applied if the warped board is to be made straight, 
which indicates the fact that the board is not straight by nature. By the same 
reasoning, since human beings must learn and practice the rites if they are to act 
morally and to bring order to a society, it can be shown that acting morally is not 
human nature (Knoblock, 23.3c).22 Thus, instead of being executed by calling 
upon the innate capacities within oneself, moral acts are performed under the 
guidance of the rites, and hence humans must exert their own effort in order to be 
moral. For instance, human beings have the desire to eat when starving, and they 
will fight others over food. Hence, deference to one’s parents would not be 
possible without learning (Knoblock, 23.1c–d). Furthermore, Xunzi has observed 
that human relations are often seen as instrumental: once individuals set up their 
own family, they may cease to observe filial obligations; once they have satisfied 
their desires, they may no longer be faithful to their friends and lords. Once their 
desires are satisfied, human beings would fail to observe their obligations as 
required by various relations and he thus concludes that their nature is ugly (bu 
mei 不美) (Knoblock, 23.6a).  
It is in the consequentialist sense that the rites are able to transform human 
desires and bring order to a society, and it is in the non-consequentialist sense that 
the practice of the rites marks the distinction between human beings and beasts 
that the rites are said to be able to beautify human nature. From a consequentialist 
point of view, humans are no longer driven by their immediate desires and social 
order can be maintained within a society. As the rites define social classes and 
allocate resources accordingly, human desires are refined in such a way that are 
appropriate to their social status, and humans are allowed to satisfy their refined 
desires through proper means prescribed in the rites. For instance, with the help of 
the noble persons, ordinary people would be able to taste fine food such as rice 
                                                     
22 For this section, my interpretation on the Chinese text is different from that of Knoblock. Part of 
Knoblock’s translation of this section is “since the nature of man is evil, it must await the government 
of the sage kings and the transformation effected by ritual and morality before everything develops 
with good order and is consistent with the good,” where “the nature of man is evil” becomes a premise 
rather than a conclusion. However, I contend that Xunzi aims to show that humans are not good by 
nature with the help of an analogy with the warped board in this section, and hence I do not follow 
Knoblock’s translation here. I still include Knoblock’s section for reference. 
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and meat and come to desire them. Furthermore, although it is a fact that human 
beings want to indulge in immediate luxury, they nonetheless also want their 
wealth to perpetuate, and thus they are willing to lead the life prescribed by the 
rites in order to obtain their new objects of desire (Knoblock, 4.9-4.11).23 As 
human beings form new desires and have them satisfied in accordance with the 
rites, they no longer fight against each other for resources, and societal chaos is 
thus prevented.  
From a non-consequentialist point of view, human nature is refined in such a 
way that they are distinguished from beasts. Despite the fact that Xunzi calls for a 
transformation of nature, for human beings to learn to become moral agents, he 
does not renounce their inborn nature. Xunzi asserts that even ancient sage kings 
were born with the same inborn nature as those of ordinary people, and hence 
human beings are not evil by virtue of their inborn nature. Nonetheless, human 
beings should not leave their inborn nature uncultivated (lou 陋); they should 
strive to render their nature complete through the practice of the rites (Knoblock, 
4.9, 19.6). This is not only for the benefit of a society, but also because such 
practice is the beauty itself that marks the distinction between humans and 
beasts. Take funeral rites as an example again. Xunzi asserts that as long as they 
have awareness (zhi 知), even animals and birds will grieve the loss of their mates. 
Since human beings are superior among those that have awareness, if they do not 
grieve as the beasts do, they do not even amount to beasts (Knoblock, 19.5a, 
19.9b). As it is the inborn nature of both human beings and beasts to have various 
emotions, what distinguishes them from each other is the proper expression of 
emotions, which can only be achieved through the practice of the rites. Through 
employing various rituals in a funeral, emotions are expressed neither in excess 
nor deficiency, but are appropriate for one’s relations with the deceased 
(Knoblock, 19.5b). Moreover, it is only through the practice of funeral rites that 
one would be able to extend one’s relationship with the deceased. If their loved 
ones die in the morning, beasts forget their relations by evening; however, 
relations among human beings continue to constitute a significant part of their 
lives even after their loved ones have departed. Through practicing the funeral 
rites, human beings are able to extend their remembrance—as well as their loyalty, 
                                                     
23 It would be another project to look into the question of how it is possible for human beings to 
transform their nature and how is it possible for the ancient kings to establish the rites in the first place. 
However, as this paper focuses on why practicing the rites could lead one to live a meaningful life, I do 
not intend to discuss this matter in this paper. For further details on this topic, see, for example, Chong 
(2008), Cua (2005), Fung (2012), Hagen (2007), Kline III and Ivanhoe (2000), and Lee (2005). 
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faithfulness, love and reverence—to the deceased and continue their relations 
(Knoblock, 19.4c, 19.11). As such, human beings are reminded of the intrinsic 
value of human relations and are willing to observe their duties even if their 
desires have been satisfied through such relations. In this sense, human nature is 
said to be beautified and is no longer ugly.  
The reason why transcending one’s animal self confers meaning to the lives 
of human beings can be explained in terms of Metz’s fundamentality theory. The 
fundamentality theory states that “a human person’s life is more meaningful, the 
more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence”,24  where “fundamental 
conditions of human existence” refers to “conditions that are largely responsible 
for many other conditions in a given domain [a living human person, human life 
as a collective, and the environment in which humans live]”.25 It is a theory of 
self-transcendence that focuses on moving beyond one’s animal self through the 
exercise of one’s rationality, such that not only are one’s decisions and volition 
rational, but also one’s conation, affection and emotions are responsive to 
reason.26 The practice of the rites is an exercise of rationality, where one refines 
one’s desires and emotions such that they are expressed as required by the 
situation (in other words, rationality is oriented to the fundamental condition in 
the domain of a living human person). At the same time, through the practice, 
people are assigned to stations that are appropriate to their talents and virtues, 
such that each person is able to perform their duties accordingly and society is 
kept wealthy and functional. As such, on top of the satisfaction of one’s own 
desires, the desires of others can also be sustained. At the same time, virtues that 
are other-regarding, such as respect, loyalty, deference, and love are cultivated 
and human relations are sustained (in other words, rationality is oriented to the 
fundamental condition in the domain of human life as a collective). Through 
maintaining a harmonious society, the practice of the rites contributes to an 
environment that enables the flourishing of all (that is, rationality is oriented to 
the fundamental condition in the domain of the environment in which humans 
live).  
If the “objective attractiveness” of practicing the rites lies in its function in 
bringing about an ordered society and distinguishing humans from beasts, the 
                                                     
24 Metz (2015), 222. 
25 Ibid., p. 226. 
26 Metz (2011), p. 495. 
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“subjective attraction” is manifested in the joy one experiences during the 
practice. It may be argued that if morality is not part of the inborn nature of human 
beings, and if the rites consist of rules and norms that assign people to different 
stations and prescribe duties (and even the expression of emotions associated with 
various human relations), it is impossible to find any “subjective attraction” in 
following such practices, for the rites are mere external sanctions. Furthermore, if 
the rites only prescribe behaviors, and if the question of whether one is 
performing the rites properly can only be judged by one’s behaviors, why does it 
matter if one is subjectively attracted to such a practice? While it is possible that 
one may simply follow the procedures without truly understanding them, the 
practice is not genuine if one does not express one’s emotions sincerely during the 
practice. At the same time, if one expresses one’s emotions without following the 
rites, one would harm oneself. It is only when one performs the rites and shows 
the appropriate emotions that the practice is authentic (Knoblock, 19.3). Being 
authentic to the practice of the rites requires one to see the beauty and intrinsic 
value of the practice, and those who are able to truly appreciate the rationale 
behind them would perform the rites without exerting themselves and truly take 
joy in the practice (Knoblock, 19.2d, 21.7d). In other words, the rites cannot be 
said to be properly performed if one is not engaged in the practice.  
 
4. Conclusion: What Can Xunzi’s Conception of Meaningfulness Contribute 
to Modern Societies? 
 
In this paper I have shown that the practice of the rites promoted by Xunzi 
could lead one to live a meaningful life in the sense of meaningfulness given by 
Susan Wolf, where both subjective and objective values are necessary for a life to 
be meaningful. I have shown that the practice of the rites has objective value. 
Through practising the rites and aiming for the establishment of a harmonious 
society, human beings are turned away from selfishness and oriented to a 
perspective that is indifferent to their self-interests. Furthermore, instead of 
leaving the objective value opaque, Xunzi’s conception of meaningfulness 
provides a clear picture of what counts as objective values—transcending one’s 
animal self and striving for the beautification of human nature. With the help of 
the rites, emotions are properly expressed and virtues are developed to maintain 
human relations. The beautification of human nature has objective value and is 
intrinsically valuable in that it marks the distinction between humans and beasts. 
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The subjective value of the practice of the rites lies in one’s engagement and 
enjoyment in the practice.  
While promoting the achievement of perfection in such performances, the 
practice of the rites also emphasises the importance of taking delight in them, and 
the practice itself is a manifestation of the completion of human nature. As such, 
another advantage of practicing the rites is that it solves the Paradox of the End. 
The major problem mentioned in the Paradox of the End is that people experience 
emptiness after achieving their goals, and would rather continue with their 
struggles. This problem arises when there is a clear distinction between means 
and ends, and that one desires only the ends. For instance, imagine that Sisyphus 
is keen on building a temple but has no interest in rolling boulders. Thus, the only 
reason for Sisyphus to keep rolling the boulder would be his interest in achieving 
his end. Seeing the act of rolling the boulder as only a means and not something 
that he desires, he would be caught in a dilemma: he should try to achieve his goal 
because it is what he wants, but at the same time he should not achieve it since he 
would lose a sense of purposefulness and significance after it is achieved.27 One 
of the solutions to the Paradox of the End is to eliminate the distinction between 
means and ends, where “the activity transcends the means/end categories”.28 The 
practice of the rites is said to be able to solve the Paradox of the End in this sense. 
One does not only enjoy the practice, but during the practice, one transcends one’s 
animal self and renders one’s nature complete.  
It may be objected that the rites are not applicable to the contemporary world. 
After all, it is not feasible to spend three years on mourning even if one loves 
one’s parents deeply. At the same time, a hierarchical society is against the 
modern spirit of justice, such as that presented by Rawls. In response to this 
objection, it is true that the rites that were written around two thousand years 
ago are not applicable to modern societies. Nonetheless, it is the principle (li 
理) that is important. As Xunzi has mentioned, the details of the rites may 
change over time in response to the changing environment, while the principle 
remains the same (Knoblock, 17.11). The principle of the rites is to establish a 
harmonious society in response to the fact that human beings are social animals 
and are driven by their immediate desires. Indeed, the human condition has not 
changed drastically for the past two thousand years. Whether in the past or 
present, human beings are still living in societies and are still driven by their 
                                                     
27 Landau (1995), p. 556-557. 
28 Ibid., p. 563. 
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desires, while resources are increasingly limited. In this respect, although the 
rules written in the rites are no longer applicable, Xunzi’s emphasis on the 
cultivation of other-regarding virtues that enable one to maintain human 
relations is still valuable and significant in modern societies, for human relations 
are unavoidable when human beings are living in a society. By all means, if 
Rawls’s principle of justice is proved to be more suitable in contemporary times, 
Xunzi would not object to it.  
Xunzi’s emphasis on human relations is thus subject to another criticism: the 
account of meaningful life found in the Xunzi focuses only on partial relations, 
which ignores the impartiality that is advocated by most modern moral 
principles, especially utilitarianism. The utilitarian may take a position similar to 
that of the Mohist. Instead of spending resources on the practice of the rites, 
which aims to maintain partial relations (lord and minister, parents and children, 
husbands and wives, and amongst siblings and friends), resources should be 
distributed in such a way that maximizes the happiness (or welfare) of a society, 
disregarding partiality. Take the modern movement of effective altruism as an 
example. Being an effective altruist is not simply to maximise happiness in this 
world, but to adopt the most effective way of doing so. For instance, instead of 
going to a distant country and helping people in need, one should probably work 
in a career that allows them to make as much money as possible; in doing so, one 
would be able to donate as much money as possible, allowing for the hiring of 
more aid workers and saving more people’s lives as a result. 29  It may be 
suggested that by participating in effective altruism, one is still able to maintain 
partial relations in order to maximize effectiveness. Nonetheless, these partial 
relations would then be seen as means only. Xunzi would argue that these partial 
relations have intrinsic value in that they enable human beings to transcend their 
animal self. For Xunzi, to engage in partial relations requires the exercise of 
rationality, which orients one’s cognition and affection to other persons, and 
hence the engagement itself is intrinsically good. To treat partial relations as 
means only is to neglect our human nature and render human beings as mere 
beasts. Furthermore, being an effective altruist also means using oneself as 
merely a means to an end, which neglects one’s self-interests.30 I contend that the 
problem of the meaning of life is a problem that must involve self-interest: an 
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30 For an analysis of the meaning of life and utilitarianism as well as its criticisms, see Metz (2003).    
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interest for one to continue living.31 As Camus has put it nicely, if one judges that 
life is not worth living for oneself, there is no reason for that person to continue 
living. Even though Mother Teresa may still have a meaningful life, I would have 
no reason for me to continue living if a computer programme could do a better job 
in eradicating poverty than me. The matter of the meaning of life is thus by default 
a matter of satisfying one’s interest in continuing one’s life. 
The above discussion on effective altruism also reveals a tension between 
self-interest, morality and meaningfulness. It seems that while being moral 
would probably lead to a meaningful life, one’s self-interest would be 
considerably compromised. Nonetheless, if one focuses on the satisfaction of 
one’s self-interests, one is unlikely to live a meaningful life in the eyes of the 
others. I maintain that the practice of the rites could reconcile this tension. On 
the one hand, one’s interests are satisfied and one is able to rejoice in participating 
in partial relations by following the practice. On the other hand, one eventually 
becomes a virtuous person and contributes to the development of a harmonious 
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Meaning of Life and Nonsense in Tractatus  
No Answer for No Question and Some Fictional Illuminations 
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Abstract 
In this paper I clarify Wittgenstein’s position on meaning of life as exposed in Tractatus, and the 
related questions about the nonsensical and the ineffable. The problem is as follows: if there is a 
question that cannot be expressed, does it mean that there is no answer to it or rather that the 
answers are nonsensical? In order to address this issue, I develop my arguments in three parts: in the 
first step, I explain Wittgenstein’s thesis about the meaning of life as exposed in Tractatus, with an 
especial emphasis on the notions of nonsense and ineffability. In the second one, I go beyond 
Wittgenstein’s explanation in the Tractatus and refer to its two possible interpretations: the resolute 
and the illuminating ones, evaluating their plausibility and accuracy. Lastly, I provide some fictional 
examples in order to illustrate my explanation and to show, indirectly, what according to 
Wittgenstein cannot be said. 
Keywords: meaning of life, nonsense, absurd, ineffable, mystical, existential crisis 
 
1. Meaning of life in the Tractatus 
 
In this section, I explain Wittgenstein’s conception of the “meaning of life” 
in his Tractatus, merely for expositive purposes. In his Tractatus 1 , first 
published in 1917, the Austrian philosopher stated that the questions about the 
meaning of life (among others, why do we exist? What is the point of being 
alive? Why are we here, alive, instead of dead?) cannot be formulated. The 
reason of this thesis is that the only kind of problems that human beings can 
define and solve are the problems of natural science (T4.11). These problems 
refer to physical facts, which are studied and solved by chemistry, biology... The 
main feature of answerable questions and their answers is that all of them are 
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measurable, quantitative and objective, contrastable by experience and common 
to all human being. 
However, and this is the main difficulty this inquiry faces, Wittgenstein also 
stated that even if all possible scientific questions were answered, the problems 
of life would have not been touched at all (T6.52). That is, scientific research 
can provide answers to problems such as the composition of a material, when 
and how the Earth became the Earth, when dinosaurs disappeared, decode the 
DNA and similar... However, no scientific investigation will answer 
metaphysical queries, questions related with our beliefs or our feelings, etc. For 
metaphysical questions are beyond science, they cannot be formulated or solved 
by any quantitative and measurable method. It is also possible that different 
human beings have different answers to these questions, so there is no an only 
and unique answer to them. Moreover, Wittgenstein stated they cannot be 
answered, because our language is insufficient to express them. Our scientific, 
objective and quantitative methods cannot grasp them either. These questions 
belong to what cannot be said: the ineffable. 
In order to understand properly Wittgenstein’s position on the ineffable, it is 
important to notice that according to the Tractatus the meaning of life is not the 
only question that cannot be formulated. In this category Wittgenstein also 
included the question about what a properly correct action is or the classic 
Kantian question concerning the existence of the World (LE, 6-8)2. There also 
pertain religious questions (on God’s existence, life after death; the reality of 
miracles and similar); ethical questions about the Good (what it is the absolute 
value, or the experience of feeling absolutely safe..., LE, p. 8); aesthetical 
questions (if there is absolute beauty...) and, in short, all the metaphysical issues, 
which ask about the meaning of “being”, “absolute”; or give a different, not 
every-day use, to terms such as “to be” or “good”. 
In another text, Wittgenstein summarised the main difficulty of such 
metaphysical questions with this explanation: 
 
“[…] As long as there is a verb 'to be' that looks as though it functions in 
the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’; as long as we still have the 
adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’; as long as we continue to 
talk of a ‘river of time’ and an ‘expanse of space’, etc., people will keep 
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stumbling over the same cryptic difficulties and staring at something that 
no explanation seems capable of clearing up” (CV, 22, MS 111 133: 
24.8.1931)3. 
 
There is a mistake then when we, human beings, understand and use the verb ‘to 
be’ as any other verb, or when we think that adjectives such as ‘identical’ or 
‘true’ are of the same kind as ‘red’ or ‘big’. The main problem of metaphysical 
questions is that they have a similar appearance to other questions, but are quite 
different and can neither be expressed by everyday language nor be solved with 
scientific methods. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the query about the 
meaning of life and all the aforementioned questions cannot be expressed or 
answered. 
It is not exaggerated to consider that, despite his two different periods, 
Wittgenstein tried to face the difficulties related to these metaphysical questions 
thorough his entire work. In order to avoid complexity and address one single 
topic, in this paper I will refer exclusively to the question of the meaning of life 
in Wittgenstein’s first period, that is, in the Tractatus. However, I would like to 
make clear that, although he defined a different approach to philosophy in his 
later period, these questions were still of his interest in his late work, as it is 
going to be mentioned in the final section of this paper.  
Another complexity of the early Wittgenstein’s arguments (which will be 
addressed below, especially in the second section) is that the Tractatus itself is 
composed by metaphysical questions, which are, therefore, ineffable and close 
to nonsense. That is, Wittgenstein’s first book is an example of these 
inexpressible questions that cannot be expressed or answered. However, I do not 
want to anticipate the problems of Wittgenstein’s argumentation before 
explaining it. 
As it has been already stated, according to the Tractatus, metaphysical 
questions are not problems of natural science, because they cannot be 
formulated or answered (T4.11). That is, the question about the meaning of life 
(and other philosophical questions related) cannot be formulated. Our words are 
not enough to express them and when we try to refer to them, we speak 
nonsense. 
The problem is then, and it is the main question of this paper, as follows: if 
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these questions cannot be expressed, does it mean that there is no answer to 
them? 
 
Not really, according to Wittgenstein, for when all scientific problems 
were solved, there would be no question left, and “just this is the answer” 
(T6.52). That is, Wittgenstein found the solution to the problem of life 
(and to the related metaphysical questions) in the vanishing of the 
problem itself (T6.521).  
 
According to his argumentation, the problem of life, and all our worries about it, 
simply disappears when we become aware that we cannot express or formulate it 
with our language. As human beings we experience and face this impossibility, 
especially when we try to refer with our words to the ineffable. In his “Lecture 
on Ethics”, Wittgenstein explained this impossibility with the following 
metaphor: it is like an absolutely hopelessly “running against the walls of our 
cage”. However, Wittgenstein also considered this impossible search as a 
tendency in the human mind, which he respected deeply and would never 
ridicule (LE 12).  
In other words: we face the impossibility of speaking about what cannot be 
said and, sometimes, we have lived or experienced this impossibility. For this 
same reason, Wittgenstein maintained that we can understand something that we 
cannot express (T6.521). Coming to this understanding and realising that we 
cannot speak about these topics is, according to this author, the only solution to 
this problem. 
Therefore, meaning of life cannot be expressed, it is what Wittgenstein calls 
“a mystical feeling” (T6.45), which cannot be said, just shown (T6.522). 
Moreover, whoever has understood this meaning cannot explain it (T6.521), 
cannot put it into understandable words. It is the ineffable. 
He gives yet another clue to understand this idea: the question about the 
meaning of life cannot be formulated in our language. Therefore, the riddle does 
not exist, because if a question cannot be formulated, it cannot be answered 
either (T6.51). As the meaning of life is a question that cannot be formulated, we 
just understand it when we accept that it is inexpressible. It is more a mystical 
feeling than a fact, it is (again) the ineffable. 
In a second step of his explanation, Wittgenstein proposes a method to 
elucidate this kind of metaphysical questions. The method is “to say nothing 
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except what can be said” and when someone wishes to say something 
metaphysical, demonstrate to him that he has given no meaning to certain signs 
in his propositions (T6.53).  
The Tractatus serves then as an elucidation of metaphysical problems: who 
understands this book, recognizes its aphorisms as “nonsense” (Unsinn). Then, 
he has surmounted these propositions and sees the World rightly. (T6.54). But at 
this point he cannot explain what he has understood; and if he dared to speak 
about it, his words would become nonsense.  
A terminological clarification to explain this argument properly4: in the 
Tractatus, “senseless” (Sinnlos) means something empty of meaning, 
meaningless or tautological (such as: ‘A=A’). It is the limit of logic and sense 
(T4.461). It is not understandable because there is nothing to understand. It has 
no content. On the other hand, “nonsense” (Unsinn) means absurd, a paradoxical 
content that is beyond the limits of the reasonable and understandable for human 
beings. While logical propositions are senseless, philosophical propositions and 
the queries on the meaning of the life are nonsensical (T4.0031). Once someone 
has understood that philosophical contents and the questions about the meaning 
of life are nonsensical contents that are limited by the empty bounds of logic, he 
can finally avoid referring to these nonsensical topics and sees the World rightly 
(T6.54). He has, Wittgenstein says, thrown the ladder away and then there are 
neither answers, nor questions, just silence (T7).  
Wittgenstein’s conclusion (if it can be called this way) about the question of 
life is then that the solution of the problem is its sheer vanishing (T6.521). The 
problem disappears when one acknowledges that it is absurd. It is a question that 
cannot be expressed in our language, so there is neither question nor answer. The 
only way of facing this problem is not to speak about it, become silent. It is 
precisely the last aphorism of the Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof 
one must be silent” (T7). 
 
2. Two possible interpretations of Wittgensteinian theses and of the notion 
of “nonsense” 
 
After explaining Wittgenstein’s position about the meaning of life in the 
Tractatus, I would like to ask how we can understand this position and if it is 
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consistent or even, satisfactory. We need to raise this problem in order to face 
similar situations to those posed by Eagleton (2007:36-37): if someone has an 
existential crisis and queries about the meaning of his life, a look-up in a 
dictionary for some meaning will not help him at all. In a similar way, I would 
like to consider whether it would be helpful to explain Wittgenstein’s critique to 
philosophical questions to someone who has an existential crisis or to apply the 
method proposed in the Tractatus to solve their existential doubts. That is, what 
if we tell to the sufferer that their doubts are absurd, because they are not 
expressible? What if we tell them that the only solution to their concerns is not 
to formulate these questions, to avoid them, to become silent? 
In order to answer these questions and solve (if possible) this difficulty, I 
would like to point out that Wittgenstein’s work is aphoristic, fragmentary and 
difficult to understand. There is not a unified and clear interpretation of his work, 
but rather different trends, sometimes opposed. Similarly, his critique to the 
meaning of the life in the Tractatus is complex and controversial. It has not been 
unanimously understood and is open to manifold interpretations, which give 
different answers to the raised question. Thus, in the following subsections, I 
analyse two different ways of interpreting Wittgenstein’s position on the 
question of life in the Tractatus: namely, the resolute and the illuminating ones. 
Each of them understands differently what “nonsense” means and gives 
divergent answers to the aforementioned questions. 
 
2.1 The resolute answer to the question of meaning of life 
 
One of the most recent and controversial ways of understanding the 
Tractarian critique to the meaning of life is the resolute reading, proposed by 
James Conant and Cora Diamond, among other authors. They understand 
Wittgenstein’s solution to the meaning of the life (and all the related 
metaphysical questions) in a radical way and propose to eliminate these 
questions: 
According to Conant, the primary characteristic of the resolute reading of 
the Tractatus is the rejection of the idea that this book has something that 
requires being grasped and applied by the reader, a method or a way of living 
according to some content… (2006:173-174. Italics by Conant). This author also 
rejects the idea that the sentences of the Tractatus content a theory that specifies 
the conditions under which some sentences or actions make sense or not. Quite 
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the opposite, the resolute readers reject the idea that Wittgenstein aimed to put 
forward substantive theories, doctrines or concepts in his work. The kind of 
philosophy that Wittgenstein sought to practice not consisted in putting forward 
theories, but in an activity of elucidation and dissolution of philosophical 
concepts and existential doubts. These doubts are dissolved when the reader of 
the Tractatus understands them as nonsensical and discards them (Conant, ib.). 
The Tractatus itself, all the content and related metaphysical questions are 
thus, according to Conant, just plain nonsense. They mean nothing, are purely 
absurd and have to be dissolved (2006:176). Therefore, it is not possible to add 
anything else after Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical questions. We cannot 
say anything about the meaning of life. There is not answer to this question, the 
only valid approach to it is its dissolution.  
In this sense, the Tractatus is committed “just to a piecemeal approach to 
solving philosophical problems”, which consists in showing that those 
metaphysical contents, which seemed to be profound and somehow 
“life-guiding”, were, in fact, mere nonsense (Conant, 2011:626). The only 
possible way of understanding this book is to become aware that the first “state 
of understanding” of the book was only apparent (Conant, 2011:628). There is 
nothing to understand, think or apply after reading this book, just pieces of 
nonsense that must be dissolved. 
A clarification may be required to understand this position properly: for the 
resolute readers the term “nonsense” just denotes a critique and a way of naming 
a sort of illusion, namely, the one that is generated through the inability of 
speakers to understand their own lack of understanding. In the first and wrong 
reading of the Tractatus, the confused reader did not have a clear view about 
what he was doing with these words. Apparently, he seemed to understand 
something, but actually he did not understand it, because there was nothing to 
understand (2011:630). Once he has acknowledged this nonsense and the 
illusion is manifest, there is nothing more to understand or speak about. The 
content has shown to be nonsensical, then the problem has been solved and there 
is just silence. 
In a similar vein, Cora Diamond explains the way of getting rid of the 
illusion of understanding the Tractatus, and subsequently, the way of becoming 
aware about the nonsense that entails all the questions about the meaning of life. 
In proposing this, she follows the aphorism 6.54 of the Tractats, which I quote: 
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“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
after he has climbed up on it.) 
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly” 
(T6.54) 
 
According to Diamond, a resolute reading of the Tractatus implies “to throw the 
ladder away”. That is, to throw away any “attempt to take seriously the language 
of 'features of reality'” or even to understand terms such as “meaning” or 
“sense” in a substantive and referential way (1988:7). Diamond maintains that 
reading Wittgenstein’s work resolutely requires a serious commitment to 
“not-chickening-out” with our language. Moreover, according to Diamond, 
Wittgenstein never asserted that there are features of reality that cannot be put 
into words, but shown. There is nothing mystical or profound in the Tractatus, 
there is nothing like some “sort of mysterious kind of meaning” that cannot be 
said, but just shown. Quite the opposite, in this book there is just confusion and 
nonsense (1988:7). 
Diamond admits that sometimes it may be useful, or even necessary, to 
speak about the meaning of life, or to look for a mystical approach to our 
concerns (for example, in faith or looking for a religious relief to a personal 
crisis…). Notwithstanding, she also maintains that these contents are not present 
in the Tractatus at all. That is, if we accept the resolute understanding of the 
Tractatus, the content (if can be called so) of the book has to be let go of and 
honestly taken to be what they really is: “a real, plain nonsense”. (Diamond, 
1988:8). 
In conclusion, according to Conant and Diamond, speaking about 
metaphysical questions or about the meaning of life after the Tractatus turns out 
to become a real, plain nonsense. We cannot speak about these topics and 
pretend to make sense. And, which is more important to the topic of this paper, 
we cannot pretend that there are solutions to our vital and existential queries in 
Wittgenstein’s work. Maybe someone can find answers to these queries in the 
faith or in other branches of the philosophy, but never in the Tractatus, which is 




2.2 The illuminating answer to the question of the meaning of life 
 
An alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein’s critique to meaning in the 
Tractatus can be found in Peter Hacker’s Illusion and Insight (1986/1997). 
Some authors, for example Conant who criticises deeply Hacker’s thesis, call 
this interpretation the “standard view” (Conant, 2006:174). I will call it the 
“illuminating view”, due to its content. 
According to Hacker, in a first reading, the Tractarian solution to the riddle 
of life is unconvincing and even annoying. Remaining silent about what cannot 
be said is not enough to solve philosophical questions, even less when these 
questions are not only theoretical, but linked to existential doubts and vital 
concerns. For this very reason, for the dissatisfaction that this first reading of 
Tractatus causes (on a theoretical and also on a vital level), Hacker maintains 
that this unconvincing solution means something, which he calls an 
“illuminating nonsense” (1986:18).  
In opposition to the “plain nonsense”, which resolute readers find in the 
Tractatus, Hacker distinguishes between two different kinds of nonsense: the 
misleading and the illuminating ones. Moreover, he addresses a severe critique 
−also inspired in the Tractatus− to the philosophy in its traditional sense and to 
the resolute readers, as well.  
Hacker accepts and follows the Tractarian delimitation about what can be 
said and not. However, he does not stop at the moment of silence, apparently 
established in the seventh aphorism of the book, but tries another approach in an 
attempt to grasp the ineffable. According to Hacker, philosophy is not enough to 
understand ourselves and our lives. The solution of the riddle of life cannot be 
found just in philosophy: a mere theoretical, philosophical answer to our queries 
will be empty or nonsensical (1986:21). Following the Tractatus, Hacker 
criticises the conception of philosophy as a discipline that provides knowledge 
about “the essential, metaphysical, nature of the world” (1986:14). If someone 
tried to say something meaningful about metaphysical topics from a 
philosophical perspective, he would be incoherent and his words would become 
nonsensical. In other words, if we accept the Tractarian critique to metaphysics 
and its delimitation of sense, we also have to accept that any attempt to describe 
the essence of things will violate boundaries of sense, misuse language and will 
be nonsensical. (1986:21). 
This is the misleading nonsense that appears, according to Hacker’s 
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interpretation of the Tractatus, when philosophers try to express what just can be 
shown (1986:19). Examples encompass theological proofs to demonstrate the 
existence of God, philosophical theories about the Good, the Beauty or any 
attempt at defining meaningful thesis about the meaning of life, as it was 
explained in the first section of the present paper. However, according to Hacker, 
the Tractarian critique to philosophical and existential questions does not mean 
that there is no sense or no possibility of understanding the ineffable. Hacker 
finds here the second notion if nonsense: the illuminating one.  
According to Hacker, when we acknowledge the nonsense that appears in 
philosophy, also appears some light, under which we understand something. 
This is what he calls an “illuminating nonsense”. It is illuminating because it 
guides the attentive reader to apprehend what was shown by nonsensical 
propositions. We only understand it indirectly and incompletely (1986:18).  
Hacker accepts that Wittgenstein never used the expression “illuminating 
nonsense”. What the Austrian philosopher said, as it has been already explained, 
was that the propositions of the Tractatus elucidate something, when they are 
understood as nonsensical. They are pseudo-propositions over which one can 
climb in order to see the World aright. When one has realised that these 
propositions are nonsensical and has thrown away the ladder, one would be, so 
to say, “illuminated”. He has thus acquired another perspective about philosophy 
and the World (1986:26). In this sense, Hacker maintains that the Tractatus 
presents nonsensical pseudo-propositions that bring some light to the reader and 
make some sense about the ineffable and nonsensical (1986:25). 
There is then something beyond philosophy and beyond Tractatus, which 
has a strange and unclear sense. It cannot be said it in proper words, just 
illuminated or reflected by nonsense.  
There are some additional texts of the early Wittgenstein that support 
Hacker’s idea of “illuminating nonsense”. In the preface of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein wrote that this book “will draw a limit to the expression of 
thoughts”. However, in order to draw such limit, “we should have to be able to 
think both sides of this limit”, that is, “we should have to be able to think what 
cannot be thought”. This limit can be drawn only in language and “what lies on 
the other side of the limit will be nonsense” (T, p.3). Wittgenstein also wrote in a 
letter to Ficker, the editor of the Tractatus, that this book “consists of two parts: 
the one presented here, plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this 
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second part that is the important one”5. 
Thus, according to Wittgenstein, there is something beyond the boundaries 
established by language and logic. We can think about it, without being able to 
express it properly. It is certainly nonsensical and inexpressible. 
Notwithstanding, this is the most important part of the Tractatus, the one that 
cannot be said. 
Following these texts, Hacker coins the expression “illuminating nonsense”. 
He maintains that, although we speak nonsense when we try to grasp meaning of 
the ineffable (for example, when we try to say something about the meaning of 
life), and although these nonsenses say nothing about the World, they do reveal 
or show certain qualities of logic and reality, which cannot be expressed in any 
other way. He also calls it a “meaningless nonsense”, in reference to 
propositions that do not say anything but show some unsayable content 
(1997:16). Using another metaphor, Hacker explains that the “nonsensical 
sentences of the Tractatus manage to echo or whistle the metaphysical melody 
of what cannot be uttered for an insightful reader”. These sentences are 
categorised as “illuminating nonsenses” and, despite being nonsensical sensu 
stricto, are nevertheless able to convey insights into the hidden nature of reality 
and ourselves (Hacker, 1997:18). 
There are, then, some contents (maybe not contents; but echoes, whistles or 
mirror reflections) that resound in Wittgenstein’s critique to philosophical 
meaning in the Tractatus. We cannot address these weird contents directly, as 
our words fail in this task and become nonsensical; but we can express or show 
them in a different, not verbal or logical way, which is close to absurd. 
Questions about the meaning of life, and the nonsense that they entail, can be 
placed in this complicated and absurd field.  
 
2.3 Comparison and closing remarks 
 
I have explained two interpretations regarding the notion of “nonsense” in 
Tractatus and their related answers to the query about the meaning of life. 
According to the resolute readers, this question cannot be formulated properly 
and correctly from the Tractarian perspective. It is possible to obtain answers to 
this query from other fields, but certainly not in the Tractatus. Any pretension of 
                                                     
5 Wittgenstein’s “Letter to Ficker”, quoted by von Wright (1971:16). 
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finding a solution to the riddle of life in this book will only bring nonsense and 
misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s work. On the contrary, according to Hacker, 
there are two different kinds of nonsense: the explicit and misleading one, which 
emerges when we try to speak about what cannot be said; and the indirect, 
illuminating or meaningless one, which appears beyond the limits of the 
understandable and expressible. The second one can be just whistled or reflected, 
not expressed by meaningful words. 
A necessary clarification is required to frame this comparison and make my 
point clear: I do not consider that resolute readers are wrong in their 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work. I accept that on the hermeneutic level 
(where Wittgenstein’s work is interpreted to the letter) the resolute theses are 
correct, solid and well argued. I also accept that the resolute readers are more 
interested in philosophical and theoretical debates (the meaning of meaning) 
than in existential or vital crises (the meaning of our lives). However, if we 
accept that the questions about the meaning of life are not just merely theoretical, 
but vital and existential concerns, I find Hacker’s answer more accurate and 
satisfactory rather than the resolute one, for the three following reasons: 
The first one is a biographical reason: it is possible to ask why Wittgenstein 
kept writing about philosophy and meaning of life, even though he stated in the 
Tractatus that the solution to the riddle of life was to become silent. That is, he 
wrote the Tractatus in 1917. Then, he abandoned philosophy, became a school 
teacher and a gardener, and after some existential crises, he came back to 
philosophy with a pluralistic approach to language, related to human practices 
(Monk, 1990:191ff.). Afterwards, he kept writing about philosophy until few 
days before his death. Thus, his own solution to the riddle of life was not the 
silence, but trying to say something unsayable, in a different way; trying to 
articulate some (non)sense that cannot be said, but shown somehow.  
It is also relevant to remind that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did not say 
that there is no sense, but that it cannot be expressed, just shown (T4.1212). As 
it has also been quoted above, in his “Lecture on Ethics”, he identified the 
search of an absolute good as an impossible, though respectable, search; which 
runs against the boundaries of language. In essence, it is nonsensical, but it is 
also unavoidable for any human being who tries to think about ethics or religion 
(LE, pp.11-12). Moreover, in his later work, he wrote that “the results of 
philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of 
bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of 
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language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery” (PI 119)6. In 
1938, he gave lectures on religion in Cambridge, in which he stated that 
religious believes do not rest on historic, logic or rational basis in the same sense 
as ordinary believes. Religious believes are neither reasonable, nor unreasonable. 
These believes cannot be treated as a matter of reasonability, because they 
belong to a completely different field, which is beyond history, science or 
rationality. However, it does not mean that they do not exist or are false, because 
they articulate and give meaning to the life of believers (LRB, 57-58)7. To sum 
up: in his entire life Wittgenstein tried to grasp something about what cannot be 
properly said and some of his later work and thoughts are addressed to try to 
clarify these topics. However, resolute readers barely take into account this part 
of Wittgenstein’s work and focus primarily in the Tractatus. 
The second reason is linguistic and philosophical: in their resolute 
interpretation of the Tractatus, Conant and Diamond understand language as 
completely referential, as if the only valid use of language were the scientific 
one, according to which words refer to things and nothing else can be said. This 
understanding is similar to the positivist conception of language proposed by the 
members of the Circle of Vienna, who were pursuing a distinction between the 
correct and veritable expression of reality and all the misuses of language that 
only bring confusion8. The logical atomism present in the intermediate sections 
of the Tractatus seemed to fit perfectly in this referential understanding of 
language. Therefore, the members of the Vienna Circle proposed a positivist 
interpretation of the Tractatus, according to which the verifiable sentences of 
natural science are the only valid sentences and the only possible truth9. 
However, in order to maintain this interpretation of the Tractatus, the members 
of the Vienna Circle (and the resolute readers as well) have to focus just on the 
picture theory of language proposed in the first four sections of the book and 
disregard the final parts, especially the aphorisms after the 5.6, where logic is 
defined as the boundary of the expressible and there are references to the tasks 
                                                     
6 The Philosophical Investigations are quoted as PI, followed by aphorism. 
7 The “Lectures on Religious Belief” are quoted as LRB, followed by number of page. 
8 For this interpretation, see the foundational manifesto of The Vienna Circle “The Scientific 
Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle”, published in Neurath (1973: 299-318) (There are also 
several editions of the Manifesto available online.) 
9 For this interpretation, see Hahn, “Empirismus, Mathematik, und Logik”. He was a member of the 
Vienna Circle and one of the first readers of the Tractatus. See also Carnap “Über Protokollsätze”, 
where he identifies the elementary observation sentences with the verifiable sentences of the 
Tractatus. 
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of philosophy, the ineffable and the mystical. All these contents seemed to be 
purely nonsensical and not so relevant to these interpreters. Moreover, Moritz 
Schlick (the leader of the Vienna Circle) was constantly inviting Wittgenstein to 
share the Tractatus with them, although Wittgenstein rejected all the invitations. 
Finally, he accepted to join them in some discussions, however, most times he 
did not wanted to speak about logic or philosophy; he would rather read poetry 
to the astonished logicians (see Monk, 1990:242ff.).  
Beyond the anecdotes and the philosophical debates, it is worth taking into 
account that in our everyday use of language there are more uses than the 
scientific or referential one. That is, we speak with metaphors, irony, jokes; there 
is poetry, absurd expressions and meaningful ellipsis. We understand them, they 
belong to our way of expressing ourselves and they cannot be just eliminated or 
disregarded, in order to propose a strict positivist and referential use of language. 
The consideration that the only valid use language is the scientific, referential 
one is not enough to give an account of how we, human beings, are and 
communicate. This referential conception is a strict and merely theoretical 
understanding of language, which does not take into account that in our lives 
there are much more uses of language, which are not strictly referential. These 
uses might not have a real reference in the World, might be confuse and absurd; 
however, they are part of our lives, we use and (somehow) understand them; and 
philosophers should take them into account as well. Most members of the 
Vienna Circle, nevertheless, as well as some resolute readers, do not seem to 
accept this fact and understand language in its strictly referential use10. 
The third reason has already been mentioned: it is the emotional or 
psychological one, related to the painful reality of existential crises. As Eagleton 
maintains, if someone asks about the meaning of his life, he is not asking about 
any concept or theory, but about certain vital unease; in this sense, he does not 
need logical clarification but solace, and probably he is more likely to reach for 
suicide pills than for a dictionary (2007:38). If we accept this, the resolute 
solution is not enough to face real and vital crises. That is, if someone has an 
existential crisis and wants to end up with his life, would it be useful to tell him 
that his queries are plain nonsense and have to be dissolved in order to see the 
                                                     
10 It is not my intention to generalise and apply my critique to all positivist and resolute readers. I 
understand that there are different authors in both trends, nuances in their theories and their views on 
language have varied thorough time. My critique goes against the strictly referential understanding of 
Tractatus which is present in Conant’s and Diamond’s work, analysed in this paper, and the authors of 
the Vienna Circle mentioned in footnotes 9 and 10. 
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World rightly and not formulate these doubts never again? 
It is also possible to argue that the resolute solution to existential crises is 
just located on a theoretical and abstract level, quite far away from our real and 
actual concerns. The resolute authors do not seem to understand that there is 
unawareness that cannot be expressed properly with words, but that really does 
harm. This fact (a pain that cannot be said but hurts) can be explained better by 
Hacker’s “illuminating nonsense” than by Conant’s and Diamond’s “plain 
nonsense”. For this reason I find Hacker’s answer to the meaning of life more 
accurate than the resolute one. 
I would like to make a final consideration, linked to the third reason and to 
something that can be called the “social consideration of philosophy”. When 
resolute readers understand philosophy as a merely theoretical and conceptual 
discipline and they develop their arguments on this abstract level; they also 
isolate philosophy from human lives and prevent this discipline from being 
linked to everyday concerns. This strict and abstract comprehension of 
philosophy does not allow to think the real problems, difficulties and concerns 
that worry us in our daily lives. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the 
resolute reading is a sterile and alienated understanding of philosophy, quite 
academic and deep, but quite different as well to the living philosophy that 
Socrates put into practice in the agora.  
There is, then, a barrier among the academic philosophy and the everyday 
concerns. For this same reason, philosophy is often criticised for being useless 
or proposing abstract and sterile theories, far away from our daily life. This 
critique is not just a debate among philosophers and non-philosophers, but has 
impact on philosophers’ work (for example, teaching) and for the future of the 
discipline. For example, if philosophy is understood as a useless and empty 
discipline, not related to our lives, it is more likely that legislators decide that it 
should not be taught in schools, as there is no reason to do it. Quite the opposite, 
the considerations about the meaning of life presented in this paper can serve as 
an example of “utility” of philosophy and “connection” of this discipline to 
some human concerns. So what is offered here is an answer to the question 
about why it is important to study and teach philosophy. It is my intention, then, 
to propose a real and living understanding of philosophy, following Socrates, 
and other philosophers who wanted to discuss philosophical questions on the 
street with everyone. The philosophical enterprise could be then characterized, 
Wittgenstein dixit, in the following way: “What we [philosophers] do is to bring 
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words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI 116). 
After this consideration, in the final part of the article, I will give some 
examples of answers to the query of life, which are nonsensical, and possibly 
absurd, but at the same time they are useful to express something that, strictly 
speaking, cannot be expressed. These fictional examples bring some light to the 
topic of this paper, serve as illustrations of Hacker’s concept of “illuminating 
nonsense” and, indirectly, give some (weird) answers to the query about the 
meaning of our lives. 
 
3. Showing what cannot be said: some fictional examples  
 
To close this article, I would like to propose that some fictional contents can 
serve as examples that show what cannot be said and this also can illuminate, 
indirectly, the Tractarian ineffable answer to the query of life. At the same time, 
they can bring some (strange) light to our queries and doubts about the meaning 
of life. These examples come from science-fiction stories where the question 
about the meaning of life is asked and answered in an almost unintelligible way.  
The first example is The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, by the British 
writer Douglas Adam11; the second one is The Left Hand of the Darkness, by the 
USA writer Ursula K. LeGuin. These two examples are unconventional and 
surprising answers to the question about the meaning of life that show, with a 
different tone, something related to what has been argued in this paper. 
In Adams’ example, there is a computer, called Deep Thought, which was 
processed to have all the answers of “Life, the Universe and Everything” 
(2000:113). When some wise men and women asked Deep Thought about the 
meaning of life, the computer said that there was an answer, but he needed some 
time to process it (2000:115). Seven and half million years later, Deep Thought 
finally had the answer and it was ‘42’ (2000:120). When the wise men and 
women refused it and said that ‘42’ was a nonsensical answer, the computer 
responded that if human beings were dissatisfied with that answer it was because, 
actually, they did not known what the question was (2000:122).  
In LeGuin’s case, Genry, the narrator (an explorer with a complicated 
diplomatic mission in a strange World) goes to Oderhord, a region of foretellers, 
in search for some answers about his mission. One of the foretellers, Faxe, 
                                                     
11 Eagleton also mentions this example in his book about the meaning of life (on the 42th page!) (See 
Eagleton, 2007:42ff.) 
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explains him how to formulate prophetic questions: “The more qualified and 
limited the question, the more exact the answer. Vagueness breeds vagueness” 
(1969:32). Faxe also tells Genry that some questions are not answerable and 
cannot be formulated because they wreck the humans. He gives an example: 
Lord of Shorth forced the Foretellers to answer the question about the meaning 
of life. In an effort to answer it, the Foretellers stayed in the darkness for six 
days and nights. At the end, “all the Celibates were catatonic, the Zanies were 
dead, the Pervert clubbed the Lord of Shorth to death with a stone” (ib.). 
It does not mean, Faxe follows his explanation, that questions such as the 
meaning of life do not have answer, but that knowing the answer brings 
craziness and wreck to humankind, so it is better not to ask them. The reason of 
this ban is that the unknown is what life is based on. In Faxe’s words: “The only 
thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable uncertainty” (1969:37). 
That is the only liveable answer. Any other answer would carry craziness, 
violence and death (that is, not life) to humankind. 
To close my explanation and link previous examples to the theses presented 
in this paper, I would like to point out that these two weird answers to the 
question of the meaning of life are quite Wittgensteinian, in a broad sense. 
Deep Thought’s solution to the riddle of life is Wittgensteinian because the 
computer recommends the confused human beings to clarify themselves and 
their ideas, before asking unsolvable and confuse questions. This is one of the 
methods that the later Wittgenstein proposed in his Philosophical Investigations 
with a view to avoiding philosophical misunderstandings: the “grammatical 
investigation” or “analysis”:  
 
“Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation 
sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. 
Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other 
things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different 
regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting one 
form of expression for another; this may be called an ‘analysis’ of our 
forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a 
thing apart” (PI 90) 
 
Then, according to Wittgenstein and to Deep Thought, in order to have real 
answers, it is necessary to clarify questions first. Otherwise, everything will be 
 50
confuse and unclear. 
With regard to LeGuin’s case: the answer to the riddle of life is that we 
cannot know everything because life is based on uncertainty. To be alive is to 
accept that we cannot know everything. Even though all the questions were 
solved, we would not know everything. The idea echoes almost perfectly the 
statement of the aforementioned aphorism 6.52 of Tractatus: “[...] if all possible 
scientific questions [are] answered, the problems of life have still not been 
touched at all” (T6.52).  
It does not mean that these problems do not exist or that they unanswerable, 
it is just that we cannot express them. That is not possible, because there are 
ineffable realities in our lives that we cannot grasp with our words and thoughts. 
On the contrary, asking and trying to know some things, such as the meaning of 
life, will bring craziness and death to the humankind. And “just that is the 
answer” (T6.52, again).  
Therefore, Faxe’s recommendations to avoid answering problematic 
questions that would bring craziness are similar to the following aphorisms of 
Tractatus:  
 
“The temporal immortality of the soul of man, that is to say, its eternal 
survival also after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this 
assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to 
make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive forever? Is this 
eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the 
riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. 
(It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.)” 
(T6.4312) 
 
“The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this 
problem. 
(Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of 
life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)” 
(T.6521) 
 




There is then a boundary (present in Tractatus and in Faxe’s considerations 
about the queries about life) that separates what can be known and what cannot 
be known. It is also present in the differences among what can be said and what 
can be shown, and in the differences among the scientific approach to 
knowledge and the mystical attitude. The second dimension, which is beyond 
the limit of the expressible, is present in our lives in a different and strange way. 
There are risks if we try to understand this dimension. The ineffable and the 
mystical field is beyond logic and can entail craziness. However, this is a 
dimension present in our lives. 
Therefore, there are answers to the questions of the meaning of life; 
however they cannot be expressed, just shown indirectly by nonsenses, or by 
what Hacker calls “illuminating nonsenses”, such as those I have presented, 
following Adams’ and LeGuin’s examples.  
A final consideration is required to close my argumentation: science-fiction 
is not the only way of trying to show what cannot be said. There are many 
different ways of trying to grasp that. For example, Hacker refers to singing or 
whistling (1997:18). The “only” requisites to access to this nonsensical field are 
to overcome the aforementioned scientific and positivist comprehension of 
language and to be open to other possible expressions of reality. It is possible to 
reach some sense and unexpected answers to the queries of our lives with 
abstract art, creativity, humour, absurd, poetry..., more efficiently than with deep 
and abstract philosophical thoughts. 
And Wittgenstein was also aware about his possibility when in his lecture on 
aesthetics he stated that:  
 
“The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an 
aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by 
experience or by statistics as to how people react […] e.g. you can try 
out a piece of music in a psychological laboratory and get the result that 
the music acts in such and such a way under such and such a drug. This 
is not what one means or what one is driving at by an investigation into 
aesthetics.” (LAE, III, 11, p. 21)12 
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The Philosophical Investigations as a Christian Text 
Christian Faith and Wittgenstein’s Rule-following 
Jairus Diesta Espiritu* 
 
Abstract 
Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being 
one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the 
Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest 
explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as 
far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as 
an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been much ink spilled in the mystical aspects of his 
philosophy. Although there are hints of his Christian leanings, patent parallelisms have yet to be 
drawn properly. Exploring Christian faith and rule-following, this paper asserts that the former is 
how the latter is characterized in the Philosophical Investigations. Faith and rule-following both 




The question of meaning in life has intentionally been left out in the analytic 
literature. But recent years have seen the demise of this tendency of analytic 
philosophy. Part of those to be blamed for this tendency is Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the unfortunate positivistic interpretation of his earlier work.1 As one of the 
greatest minds of the 20th century, his pronouncement of the nonsensicality of 
the question meant its exclusion in succeeding discourses. 
But such tendency has changed in recent years. For the past twenty or thirty 
years, the analytic literature has seen a surge in the number of philosophers 
taking up the question.2 Analytic philosophers have also began taking up 
metaphysical questions—a field largely discredited by early analytic philosophy. 
The discussion of religion per se in the analytic literature has also been rare, 
if not absent. This is not the tendency at all especially during the Middle Ages. It 
was when a lot (if not all) philosophers were religious, coming from the 
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Christian, Jewish, and Moslem sorts.3 The Enlightenment, however, managed to 
wipe out such close connection between religion and philosophy. As anti-clerical 
sentiment grew during that time, so did anti-religious sentiments.4 I do not 
mean to say that there are no discussions on the philosophy of religion (for 
indeed there are plenty). This dropping out consists of a more secular approach 
to religiosity. But as analytic philosophy has changed in recent years, it is 
conceivable that religious discourse can again come back into the philosophical 
scene. 
As heirs to the Enlightenment, analytic philosophy missed out a lot of 
Christian tendencies in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. Indeed, his Christian tendencies 
have manifested in his personal life. But whether there are Christian themes in 
his works is seldom talked about. 
In this paper, I will draw out one Christian aspect of his later work, the 
Philosophical Investigations. I will be drawing a parallel between faith and the 
discussion on rule-following in the Investigations, asserting that the latter is how 
Christianity understands the former. It seems that how rules are followed sheds 
light into how faith is conceived by Christianity. 
I do not wish to assert that Wittgenstein in his person is Christian and that 
his religious leaning is the reason why there is a Christian theme in the 
Investigations. These two assertions could be the topic of an altogether different 
project. What I intend to assert is the Christianity of the Investigations as a text, 
highlighting the similarity between Christian faith and rule-following. 
 
2. Christian Faith 
 
The relationship between faith and reason has always been the subject of a 
plethora of debates ever since Christianity and philosophy met. But in this paper, 
I will be focusing my discussion on faith itself, and not on the usual discussion 
of its relationship with reason. To avoid controversy on the Christianity of the 
“faith” to be discussed in this paper, I have chosen to cite the Magisterium5 of 
the Catholic Church. This only means that the principal sources of this section’s 
discussion will be from the teachings sanctioned by the Church herself. This 
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does not mean to discredit philosophical discussions of it like Kierkegaard’s. It 
may be admitted that these non-canonical discussions are helpful.  
Observing that the two terms are almost interchangeable in the Bible, 
Benedict XVI conflates faith with hope.6 Drawing from Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, the title of the Pope’s encyclical, Spe Salvi, suggests such conflation. It 
comes from a larger biblical phrase, “Spe salvi facti sumus,” or “In hope we are 
saved.”7 As it seems impossible to be saved without faith, with this conflation, 
it now seems impossible to be saved without hope. It follows that Christian faith 
is hope.  
In another letter, Paul talks about how before Christ, there was no hope.8 
Hence, Christians believe that it is only after Christ that they started to hope. It 
is through an encounter with the divine that an individual gains hope, thereby 
gaining faith. Benedict XVI talks about faith as letting the faithful “share in 
Jesus’ vision.”9 Faith, therefore, provides a way of seeing. 
This encounter gives the Christian the evidence that she needs for things that 
she believes in. The Letter to the Hebrews gives this very notion: “Faith is the 
hypostasis of things hoped for; the proof of things not seen.”10 Hypostasis here, 
is believed to be the central word of the verse by many exegetes today. It is 
translated in Latin as substantia.11 This points to how faith makes present things 
that have yet to be present. It is the substance of these soon-to-be-present things. 
Hence, with faith, things hoped for are just as real as things that are in front of 
one’s eyes. 
Taken this way, faith seems to be an epistemological device. But Benedict 
XVI points out that faith is not purely informative but performative. It is not a 
function of the mind to gain faith in Christ but the function of the whole 
individual: 
 
That means: the Gospel is not merely a communication of things that can 
be known—it is one that makes things happen and is life-changing. The 
one who has hope lives differently; the one who hopes has been granted 
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the gift of a new life.12 
 
Here, faith does not give the Christian a theoretical knowledge but a practical 
one. This distinction goes back to Aristotle, in his distinction between the moral 
and intellectual virtues.13 In a way, faith comes close to giving us phronesis, or 
practical wisdom. 
Gustavo Gutierrez points out that action, for Christians, is not a product of 
theological reflection of their faith. Action comes directly from faith and it is 
only afterwards that theology can come into play.14 For instance, no one had to 
tell the martyrs to die before they deny their faith in Christ. A thorough 
theological background is not necessary to become a martyr. The mere presence 
of faith is enough to lead one to act in a certain way. Faith, therefore, is a 
sufficient condition for action. 
In this brief section, I have characterized faith in two ways: 
 
(1) Faith provides a way of seeing 
(2) Faith is a sufficient condition for action. 
 
I propose that both of these characteristics are present in the discussion of 
rule-following in the Investigations. Moreover, (2) is a consequence of (1). 





3.1. Providing a way of seeing 
 
The Tractarian pronouncement that the “limits of my language are the limits 
of my world”15 still rings true, in a certain sense, in the Investigations. His 
discussion of color-terms, for instance, reduces the redness of red to a function 
of language. When asked how he knew that something is red, he simply replied 
that he learned English.16 This should not be read as an endorsement of a 
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relativism of sorts. This only means that when we see something as X, it is a rule 
that gives us the term to refer to X as X. 
In this sense, rules provide a way of seeing as much as faith does. One only 
sees a red rose as red because English calls it such. This is also why a dog can be 
said to be afraid of being beaten by his master while we cannot say that the dog 
is afraid of being beaten by his master tomorrow.17 The rules that dogs follow in 
their dog-game do not allow for a concept of tomorrow. Because of these rules, 
therefore, a dog sees his master’s beating in a certain way. This way excludes the 
possibility of expecting it to happen tomorrow. 
In the same vein, Christ’s dying on the cross can either be seen as salvific or 
mundane. It is because of faith that it can be seen as the former, otherwise it 
would just be the mundane death of an ambitious son of a carpenter.  
  
3.1.1. Rules and aspect perception 
 
The previous section certainly recalls Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect 
perception. A brief caesura on aspect perception is therefore in order. 
The discussion of aspect perception was included in what was traditionally 
known as Part II of the Investigations. The most recent edition, however, no 
longer distinguishes between the two parts of the Investigations. The editors 
thought that the addition of Part II was an unqualified, arbitrary decision by 
Anscombe and Rhees.18 The Investigations that is being talked about in this 
paper, therefore, only refers to what was traditionally known as Part I. 
But for the sake of clarity of concepts, I think that there is still a need to 
discuss aspect perception in relation to the overall project of this paper. This 
section will clarify the relationship among the concepts of aspect perception, 
rules, and faith. 
Fronda succinctly describes how aspect perception works: 
 
However it may be, it takes an attitude to see-as. Transposing this theme 
to a much grander scale one would have thus: what one recognizes in a 
phenomenon or cluster of phenomena is a function of one’s attitude. And 
a difference in attitude between two subjects observing the same 
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phenomenon makes two distinct recognitions of it.19 
 
It is because of a certain attitude that one is led to see certain aspects.20 
Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit example, for instance, illustrates how a 
certain attitude could predispose one to see it solely as a duck, or solely as a 
rabbit. 21  Here, the same duck-rabbit datum is being perceived but the 
recognitions differ. No recognition can be argued for as the correct one. 
It is therefore clear that to see a certain aspect is not a well-thought out 
decision.22 The seeing of an aspect just suddenly dawns on one. This dawning 
then enables one to see the aspect continuously thereafter.23 
Aspect perception is clearly provided for by rules. These rules dictate how 
one will see a certain datum. The difference in rules adopted only means 
difference in attitude. And difference in attitude means difference in recognition. 
The rules governing an attitude, dawns on one in a phenomenon called an 
aspect dawning. The gaining of faith, therefore, is an aspect dawning. What 
dawns on one is a form of seeing-as governed by certain rules. And because 
faith has been gained, one can now see things in the light of faith. 
This relationship among aspect perception, rules, and faith is best illustrated 
by the story of the conversion of Paul. On his way to Damascus to prosecute 
Christians, “a light from the sky suddenly flashed around him.”24 This light 
blinded him and it is only after being baptized by Ananias that his sight was 
restored.25 
Paul’s experience in Damascus saw a dramatic aspect-dawning. It is because 
of that experience that he began to gain faith. This newly dawned faith has 
provided him with rules governing his new way of seeing things, exemplified by 
the restoration of his sight. It is now in accordance with these rules that he 




                                                     
19 Fronda (2010) p. 102. 
20 Philosophy of Psychology I—A Fragment 193; hereafter cited as PPF. 
21 PPF 118. 
22 PI 601-603; PPF 191-192. 
23 Fronda (2010) pp. 105-107. 
24 NAB Acts 9:3. 
25 NAB Acts 9:18. 
26 NAB Acts 9:20. 
 60
3.2. Sufficient for action 
 
Faith conceived as sufficient for action is laconically clarified by 
Wittgenstein’s discussion on rules. In this way, Christian faith is very much 
similar to how Wittgenstein conceived of rule-following. 
Following a rule for Wittgenstein is not an intellectual activity. He claims 
that learning a language is mastering a technique.27 Following linguistic rules is 
therefore a skill. The best way to illustrate this is through a comparison with 
swimming. One does not learn how to swim by pure intellection of all the 
guidelines on how to swim. One learns how to swim through engaging with the 
activity of swimming itself.28 The same is true in rule-following. If one only 
thinks that she follows a rule, she does not really.29 
Rule-following, therefore, is inherently performative, as much as faith is. It 
is not constituted in thinking about all the applications of a rule in advance as if 
it were an algorithm. 30  Wittgenstein compares this misconception of 
rule-following to a machine. As a machine has algorithms which it follows, so 
do human beings. A rule can be likened to a machine’s algorithms. But, says 
Wittgenstein, this analogy does not take into account the possibility of the 
machine breaking down. The algorithm would not be able to salvage the 
machine in its application of the rule. 31  Rule-following, therefore, is not 
constituted by an algorithm. 
This is precisely why rule-following is not a mental activity but an act. As 
one constantly applies a rule the same way, there seems to be a decision in every 
application of the rule.32 This conception of rule-following goes into the grain 
of Wittgenstein’s battle cry in the Investigations: “Don’t think but look!”33 
Wittgenstein, however, says elsewhere, “Theology as grammar.”34 This 
pronouncement is very obscure as it does not explicitly use the copula. This 
immediately follows a brief assertion that “grammar tells what kind of object 
anything is,” in the same section. Other scholars take this to consider theology 
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and all god-talk as purely grammatical.35 This is a strong assertion. But what I 
would like to point out is only the connection of this section with how Gutierrez 
places theology with faith. 
It is grammar that specifies the essence of the object36 and theology is 
grammar. Object, therefore, comes first before grammar can specify its essence. 
This is very much like how faith-led action comes first before theology can 





This paper was able to assert that Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
rule-following in the Investigations is how Christianity understands faith: (1) it 
provides a way of seeing, and (2) it is a sufficient condition for action. Because 
of drawing up this connection, a correlation between Wittgenstein’s religious 
convictions and his philosophy is, at most, hinted at. 
Wittgenstein was quoted saying that he was “strongly affected by 
[Nietzsche’s] hostility against Christianity.”38 Alain Badiou, however, does not 
read this as a confession of the Christian faith. Such remark, as Badiou reads it, 
is a confession of an eternal, unspeakable sense of the world which is not 
necessarily Christian.39 Elsewhere, Wittgenstein is quoted saying that he cannot 
help but see things in a religious point of view.40 
Badiou may or may not be correct. But whether this religiosity is indeed 
Christian is an altogether different question. Whatever the correct interpretation 
of these remarks may be, they are enough to prove his religiosity.   
Wittgenstein is known to be very keen on the tiniest details of his drafts of 
the Investigations. Therefore, the patent parallelisms drawn in this paper should 
not be seen as coincidental. This opens up an avenue for tracing more Christian 
themes in the Philosophical Investigations, the question of Wittgenstein’s own 
religious convictions, and the relationship between the two.  
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The Moral Status of Infants and Fetuses  
Teleological Potential, Justice and Charity  
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Abstract 
In this paper, I review accounts of the moral status of infants and fetuses to show that they either fail 
to establish that infants are properly rights-bearers or fail to explain the grounds of this status. I then 
develop an account of teleological potential understood with reference to Phillipa Foot’s Natural 
Norms and argue that it can ground the rights-bearing status of infants and fetuses while avoiding 
the typical objections to potentiality-based accounts. I then incorporate this into a two-fold account 
of moral status directed at concerns of justice and charity, and grounded in sophisticated cognitive 
capacities and sentience respectively, which allows one to maintain that fetuses possess 
rights-bearing status alongside the intuition that infants are due more moral consideration. Finally, I 
consider potential objections based on concerns about women’s autonomy and implications about 
the severely cognitively disabled.  
 
Although abortion remains highly contested in political spheres, recent 
philosophical literature tends to support a permissive view, reflecting the 
dominance of accounts that ground rights-bearing in sophisticated cognitive 
capacities.1 Lacking such capacities, the typical argument goes, the fetus lacks 
the normative personhood and attendant rights that form the basis of a strong 
embargo against killing it. The requirement of sophisticated cognitive capacities, 
however, also excludes infants from normative personhood. 2  Those who 
maintain that infants are properly rights-bearers, therefore, have reason to think 
such accounts incomplete. To my mind, the most straightforward response to 
infants’ lack of sophisticated cognitive capacities is to appeal to their potential to 
develop such capacities, which suggests that fetuses are similarly entitled to 
moral consideration. However, even if one is sympathetic, as I am, to fetal rights, 
it undeniably seems worse to harm an infant than to harm a very early fetus or a 
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zygote. This essay aims to ground the rights-bearing status of both infants and 
fetuses while respecting this intuition. Towards this end, Section I motivates this 
project by reviewing existing accounts and showing how they fail either to 
establish infants’ intrinsic rights-bearing status or to satisfactorily ground their 
possession of such status. Section II then develops an account of teleological 
potential as the grounds for rights-bearing status and Section III integrates this 
account into a two-fold account of moral status based on justice and charity and 
shows how this can explain why infants morally matter more than fetuses. 
Finally, Section IV considers some possible objections. 
 
I: Existing Accounts 
 
This section examines the pro-abortion and anti-abortion literature in search 
of an account that both ascribes rights-bearing status to infants and successfully 
explains the grounds for it. I will begin by clarifying some key terms. First, 
moral status refers how much an entity or its interests morally matter for the 
entity’s own sake, and may be distinguished from moral standing, understood as 
whether an entity matters morally.3 Next, full moral status indicates that one is 
due the highest moral consideration and is sometimes described in terms of 
personhood, where to be a person in a normative sense is to possess full moral 
status. One feature of full moral status is that it entails pre-emptive moral 
consideration, or the possession of moral rights. I will refer to this specifically as 
rights-bearing status. 
Perhaps the most influential view is that rights-bearing status is grounded in 
the possession of certain sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as autonomy,4 
self-awareness,5 or the ability to conceive of oneself as a continuous subject of 
mental states.6 Precisely which capacity is unimportant for the purposes of this 
paper. What is important is that both infants and fetuses lack these sophisticated 
cognitive capacities. Some theorists, notably Tooley and Singer, bite the bullet 
and accept that infants therefore are not normative persons.7 Although other 
prudential reasons to treat infants as if they are rights-bearers may mitigate the 
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practical consequences of this, the notion that infants are not intrinsically 
rights-bearers is still repugnant to commonsense morality. 
One account that seeks to explain the moral consideration intrinsically due 
to infants is Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interests Account (TRIA). 
Ultimately, McMahan endorses some form of the sophisticated cognitive 
capacities account.8 In addition, however, he introduces the TRIA to explain the 
moral concern due to entities who lack such capacities. According to the TRIA, 
how much an entity or its interests matters morally depends not only on the 
strength of those interests, but also on the strength of the psychological 
connections, such as memory and hope for the future, between the individual 
presently and the individual when those interests will be realized.9 This allows 
McMahan to explain why it is worse to kill infants than to kill animals: in virtue 
of their potential for sophisticated capacities, infants have extremely valuable 
futures, even discounted by their weak psychological connections to those 
futures.10 Next, the TRIA can also explain why infants are due more moral 
concern than fetuses: once infants are born they are exposed to much stimuli, 
leading their cognitive capacities develop very quickly thus enabling them to 
have greater psychological connections to their later interests, and entitling them 
to more moral concern. 11  Ultimately, however, although infants’ valuable 
futures and rapidly increasing psychological connections to these futures entitle 
them to some intrinsic moral status, it still does not ground rights-bearing. 
Next, moving away from the sophisticated cognitive capacities account, 
another influential account is Joel Feinberg’s interest view which grounds 
rights-bearing status in the capacity for interests.12 Despite focusing on interests, 
however, Feinberg still requires certain sophisticated cognitive capacities for 
rights-bearing status, because he holds that the capacity for conscious 
self-awareness is prerequisite for desires, which in turn is necessary for having 
interests.13  Ultimately, therefore, Feinberg’s view implies that infants lack 
intrinsic rights-bearing status, although he does mitigate this by arguing 
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infanticide is wrong because of other reasons such as the common good.14 
Notably, not all who count themselves interest theorists align themselves 
with Feinberg on what is required to have interests. Bonnie Steinbock, for 
example, maintains that interests require simply the capacity for consciousness 
or sentience, which allows her to claim infants have interests.15 Crucially, 
however, Steinbock takes interests to ground moral standing rather than 
rights-bearing.16 In other words, although infants possess the capacity for 
interests on Steinbock’s account, this is insufficient to ground rights-bearing 
status. 
Thus far, I have discussed several accounts of rights-bearing which support 
a permissive view of abortion and found that none ascribe intrinsic 
rights-bearing status to infants. This is, perhaps, unsurprising since infants do 
not differ significantly from late fetuses in terms of intrinsic cognitive qualities. 
I will next examine whether the anti-abortion literature may provide a plausible 
account of the rights-bearing of infants and fetuses. 
One traditional way to ground the rights-bearing status of infants and fetuses 
is in their membership of the human species. Early versions of this view, for 
example, as posited by Stanley Benn, posit being human as both necessary and 
sufficient for rights-bearing. 17  Since this precludes other rational species, 
however, more recent accounts, such as John Finnis’s, often accept sophisticated 
cognitive capacities as the primary grounds for rights-bearing status and posit 
species membership as a secondary sufficient but not necessary condition. 18 
That is, one possesses rights-bearing status either if one possesses sophisticated 
cognitive capacities or if one is a member of a species which characteristically 
possesses such capacities. Such accounts, however, are vulnerable to the charge 
that they ground the substantial moral fact of rights-bearing in a seemingly 
morally irrelevant biological fact: It is unclear why species membership should 
be morally relevant for members who lack the morally relevant attributes,19 and 
to hold that it does, Peter Singer claims, is “speciesism” and morally equivalent 
to racism or sexism.20  The Species Membership account is unsatisfactory 
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because although it ascribes rights-bearing status to infants, it fails to explain 
why species membership should ground such status. 
Next, other influential accounts within the anti-abortion literature include 
the Sanctity of Life Account, the Special Relations Account and the Future Like 
Ours Account. Upon closer examination, however, these accounts turn out to be 
tangential to rights-bearing: according to Ronald Dworkin’s Sanctity of Life 
account, opposition to abortion derives from belief in the intrinsic, sacred and 
non-incremental value of human life.21 Since this value is non-incremental, it is 
not better for there to be more human lives, but since it is intrinsically valuable, 
there is objective reason to protect human life where it does exist. Notice, 
however, that the moral reasons thus generated are impersonal duties: abortion is 
immoral because it disrespects life, rather than because the fetus itself is worthy 
of special moral consideration.22 The sanctity of life account is silent on the 
issue of rights-bearing status. 
Next, the Special Relations Account is built on the fact that certain 
relationships, such as the parent-child relationship, generate particular duties, 
such as parents’ duty to care for their children. Robert Nozick suggests that the 
relationship of shared species membership may generate duties to treat members 
of same species with respect in a similar manner.23 Crucially, however, the 
parent-child relationship grounds the special duties of parents towards their 
children but does not change the child’s intrinsic moral status: unrelated 
individuals have no special duties to the child. Although the Special 
Relationship account may generate duties for people to treat infants with 
particular moral consideration, it does not ground intrinsic rights-bearing status.  
Finally, Don Marquis’s Future Like Ours Account (FLOA) holds that 
abortion is immoral for the same reason that killing an adult person is immoral, 
namely because it deprives the victim of a valuable future.24 The problem, 
however, is that it does not seem that what is primarily wrong about killing an 
adult person is that it deprives him of a valuable future. It is equally wrong to 
kill a 90-year-old as it is to kill an 18-year-old, despite the 18-year-old losing 
more years of good life. Death may be worse for the 18-year-old than for the 
90-year-old, but it is equally wrong to kill them both because doing so violates 
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22 McMahan (2002), p.331. 
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their right to life. Thus, although the FLOA may explain why death is bad for 
fetuses and infants, and so in a sense why it would be wrong to kill them, it does 
not address rights-bearing. 
I have now reviewed accounts of rights-bearing status on both sides of the 
abortion debate and found that they either fail to establish that infants are 
properly rights-bearers or fail to explain the grounds of this status, thus 
establishing the need for such an account. 
 
II: Natural Norms and Teleological Potential 
 
To my mind, the argument from potential, which posits that the potential to 
develop sophisticated cognitive capacities grounds rights-bearing status, is the 
most promising starting point, firstly because it is an intuitive response to 
infants’ lack of sophisticated cognitive capacities and secondly because it 
grounds rights-bearing status in an intrinsic property. This section will attempt 
to develop a plausible version of the argument from potential. 
Despite its promise, the argument from potential is infamous for two 
problems: first, the potential for X does not normally confer the rights of X.25 
For example, before 2016, Donald Trump’s potential to become president did 
not give him presidential rights until he actually realized that potential. Second, 
the argument from potential is vulnerable to the following reductio ad 
absurdum: an egg and sperm technically have the potential for sophisticated 
cognitive capacities, but most would deny that they are rights-bearers.26 
These objections are valid but need not be definitive. It is not categorically 
true that potential can never ground rights: the right to health insurance, for 
example, is grounded in the potential to fall ill rather than the actuality of being 
ill.27 Potentiality accounts may still succeed by explaining why potential should 
matter in this case.28 Meanwhile, the second problem can be answered if the 
reductio can be resisted. Whether and how an account from potential may meet 
these objections depends on how the notion of potential is cached out. 
What does it mean to have potential? One option is that X has the potential 
to become Y if X will eventually become Y. This, however, is easily subject to 
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counter-example: suppose an infant had a genetic cardiac disease that would kill 
him before he was 3 years-old, it seems strange to suppose that he would 
therefore not be a rights-bearer whereas other infants without that disease would 
be. Alternatively, one might determine potential with respect to possibility rather 
than actuality. That is, X has the potential to become Y if X might possibly 
become Y. This however is similarly vulnerable to counter-example. Extensive 
gene therapy could render it possible for dogs to develop sophisticated cognitive 
capacities, which would imply that normal dogs possess rights-bearing status, 
which is counterintuitive.29 
These examples show that determining potential with respect to actuality or 
possibility results in a quagmire of unpalatable scenarios. The crucial thing, as 
James Griffin remarks, seems to be that “the moral significance of potentiality 
[…] depend[s] upon not only what it is potential for, but also what it is the 
potential of (italics mine)”.30 A viable account of rights-supporting potential 
must discriminate between different kinds of entities. I submit that a normative 
or teleological account of potential can do so. 
Something is normative if it derives from a standard or a norm, and 
something is teleological if it involves explanation in terms of purpose. Massimo 
Reichlin has suggested that an Aristotelian (i.e. teleological) notion of 
potentiality that conceives of a fetus as “already possessing the human nature 
(understood as a principle of becoming, rather than a static thing) and actively 
developing its potential for personhood”, 31  can ground fetal rights. 
Contemporary readers, however, may be somewhat wary of Aristotelian 
teleology.32 Where does the telos come from, they wonder? Who sets the 
norms? This essay aims to answer these questions with appeal to Phillipa Foot’s 
notion of natural norms. 
According to Foot, living things have the capacity for “natural goodness”, 
that is, they have goods (and bads) independent of the plans or desires of other 
things.33 For example, it is good for a plant to grow well, and it is bad for it to 
be diseased. This kind of goodness stands in contrast with good predicated of 
things because it benefits something else, for example, when it is good that an 
ox plough a field because the farmer desires that the ox plough the field. Natural 
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goodness is determined with respect to what is characteristically good for a 
species insofar as it furthers individual survival and propagation of the species.34 
A good x is an x that is ordinarily well-suited as an x to do or live well, to thrive 
or flourish in a characteristically x way.35 
An obvious obstacle to extending this view to people is that most now reject 
the notion of a nature-determined good for individual persons.36 A man can 
swear celibacy and there is value in that choice because he freely chooses it even 
if it is against the end of species propagation.  This intrinsic value of autonomy 
arises because people are possessed of rational capacity, and it is to this that 
Foot appeals in extending natural goodness to people.37 We can understand the 
characteristic way of being and flourishing for persons as the rational way.38 A 
thriving human being is one that autonomously chooses his own destiny, and the 
value of his doing so is properly counted natural goodness. This dovetails nicely 
with the idea that it is sophisticated cognitive capacities that makes persons 
special. 
Foot’s next key premise is that the meaning of good in “a good plant is not 
diseased” is not significantly different compared to in “a morally good man 
keeps his promises”.39 Moral goodness does not occupy a sphere distinct from 
natural goodness. This may surprise contemporary readers whose intuitions have 
been honed by John Stuart Mill to regard the moral sphere as special and 
generally other-regarding. Foot, however, argues that moral goodness fits within 
the wider class of evaluations of natural goodness and shares the same structure 
of normative evaluation: just as natural goodness is determined with respect to 
the characteristic good of a species, moral virtues are evaluated in relation to 
how they contribute to characteristic human flourishing, which is in turn 
determined with respect to natural norms. 40 For example, just as it is good to 
stay in bed when one is sick, because that furthers the pursuit of health which is 
part of human flourishing, it is on Foot’s schema, morally good to keep a 
promise because that furthers an aspect of human flourishing. Notice that this 
works only because virtue is part of human flourishing, and virtue is only part of 
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human flourishing because human beings are firstly social beings whose good is 
furthered in living in community with each other, and secondly rational beings 
who can understand morality. Moral goodness is a special subset of natural 
goodness which generates particularly important considerations and is 
applicable to beings whose rationality enables them to understand morality. 
If we accept moral goodness as a subset of natural goodness, natural 
goodness can function to explain the notion, key to moral status, of “mattering 
for one’s own sake”. The capacity for natural goodness is necessary and 
sufficient for mattering for one’s own sake, which I shall call the possession of 
normative status. Since moral value is a subset of natural value, however, 
normative status is necessary but not sufficient for moral status. A plant has 
natural goodness but does not matter morally. Something further, such as the 
sentience, is required. 
Next, natural norms provide a reference for understanding teleological 
potential. Recall that the characteristic way of man’s flourishing is via his 
rationality. This is his telos, it is the natural way in which his life is good. As 
members of the human species, infants and zygotes potentially have this 
characteristic way of flourishing, and it is good for their sake that they achieve it. 
They have the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities. In 
contrast, it is not in the nature of a dog in virtue of its dog-hood that it is 
characteristically rational, regardless of what possibilities gene therapy opens 
up. 
Notice that in basing teleology on species norms, we are implicitly 
committed to a metaphysical view of persons in which physicality is essential. 
For example, that we are essentially physical beings with emergent mental 
properties. A metaphysical view in which we are, for example, embodied minds, 
would be in tension with the important role species plays in this account. 
Next, since natural norms are determined with respect to species, one might 
worry that this is a disguised kind of speciesism. Although the account from 
teleological potential does have the same implications as the Species Norm 
account however, it differs crucially in that it explains why species is a morally 
relevant fact. By situating moral goodness within the wider concept of natural 
goodness which is determined with respect to species norms, the relevance of 
species to morality is made clear: natural goodness, which includes moral 
goodness, depends on what kind of thing something is, and what kind of thing 
something is depends on species. On this account, species is not morally 
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irrelevant. 
Having explained how teleological potential can be understood with 
reference to natural norms, I will now show how teleological potential thus 
understood can address the problems for potentiality accounts set out at the 
beginning of this section. 
The first problem was how to explain why potential should matter. Bertha 
Alvarez Manninen suggests that for potential to ground a right, potential must 
generate an interest in a moral right such that possessing the moral right 
constitutes a benefit for the potential entity and a denial of the moral right 
constitutes a harm.41 What makes this criterion plausible is that it restricts the 
scope to moral rights. Rights, such as access to healthcare, are fundamentally 
crucial to one’s well-being in a way benefits such as presidential powers are not, 
which allows explanation of why one can be grounded by potential and the other 
not. The account from teleological potential can meet Manninen’s criterion. It is 
inbuilt into the concept of teleological potential that it is good for the entity to 
realise its potential because that potential is its essential nature and not to realise 
it is accordingly a positive harm, rather than merely a lack of a good. Finally, 
although rights-bearing status is not itself a right, it is at least as important to 
well-being as a right since the possession of any right is contingent on the 
possession of rights-bearing status. Therefore, on the plausible assumption that it 
is because rights are fundamentally crucial to welfare that they can be grounded 
in potential, it seems that rights-bearing status, being similarly fundamental to 
well-being, may also be grounded in potential. 
Next, the second problem was how to resist the reductio ad absurdum that 
the potential of the sperm and the egg to develop into normative persons implies 
that they have rights-bearing status. From a teleological perspective, the sperm 
has the purpose of fertilizing the egg, and there is goodness when it does so. 
Crucially however, from a teleological perspective, the sperm is but a part of the 
man, and although it may be “good” for the sperm to fertilize the egg, the 
goodness is proper to the man, rather than to the sperm. Something cannot be 
good “for the sperm’s own sake”, because the sperm does not have a sake of its 
own. The sperm does not possess the normative status that is a precondition for 
moral status. A similar argument may be made with respect to the egg. As for the 
gametes considered jointly, although they together possess all the genetic 
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material for a full human organism, before combination they are still not one 
organism, and so should not be considered as one entity for which the question 
of moral status arises. In contrast, the zygote is not a part of either father or 
mother, but a new entity individualized by its own genetic code. Its goodness 
therefore cannot be determined with respect to either father or mother, but only 
properly with respect to itself. The zygote therefore possesses normative status, 
and being a complete human organism, the teleological potential for normative 
personhood that grounds rights-bearing status.42 Since this account does not 
depend on the zygote being numerically identical to the person it will later 
become, it is unaffected by the possibility of splitting. Splitting refers to when 
the zygote, or the few totipotent cells that it divides into, gives rise to not one 
but two individuals, that is, twins. The possibility of splitting is a problem for 
accounts that base the harm of killing the fetus on the fetus’s numerical identity 
with a later person, because if splitting occurs, the zygote is not identical to a 
later person, and cannot be identical to two people.43 In contrast, the account 
from teleological potential can accommodate the possibility of splitting, because 
the zygote possesses the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive 
capacities regardless of whether this potential is eventually actualized in one or 
more individuals. 
Some may protest that to extend rights-bearing status to the zygote is itself 
absurd. I suspect, however, that those who would make such an objection would 
also object to extending rights-bearing status to fetuses, and so would be not be 
attracted to this account anyway. Meanwhile, the majority of those committed to 
fetal rights already extend rights-bearing status to the zygote. 
In sum, this section developed an account of teleological potential based on 
natural norms. In doing so, I hope to have presented a plausible account of the 
grounds of the rights-bearing status of infants as well as fetuses. 
 
III: Justice and Charity 
 
Even ardent supporters of fetal rights, however, would be hard pressed to 
deny that infants are due more moral consideration than early fetuses or zygotes: 
if one has the opportunity to save only one of either an infant or a zygote in a 
petri-dish from a burning building, most would agree that one should save the 
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infant. This section will incorporate the account from teleological potential 
within a two-fold approach to moral status based on justice and charity to 
accommodate this intuition. 
The distinction between justice and charity is hardly novel. Justice and 
charity may pull in different directions. For example, to remunerate each worker 
according to how much he has worked is just, but to give more to he who needs 
more may be considered charitable. And since moral concerns may be directed 
at either justice or charity, it seems natural that moral status, may be directed at 
either justice or charity as well. Indeed, although the justice-based notion of 
rights-endowing moral status predominates in discussions of the moral status of 
persons, discussions of the moral status of animals often references charity.44 
I suggest that persons possess two kinds of moral status, directed at justice 
and charity respectively. Justice-oriented moral status is equivalent to 
rights-bearing status, and is grounded in sophisticated cognitive capacities, or 
the teleological potential for such capacities. Meanwhile, charity-oriented moral 
status is the moral consideration an entity is entitled to as a proper object of 
charitable feeling. Suppose someone was uncomfortably warm. Although he has 
no right, that is, no claim of justice that his discomfort be alleviated, it would be 
morally good to do so. The moral concern relevant here is not justice, but charity, 
and it is relevant because of the subject is sentient. There is no charity in fanning 
a hot rock. Charity-oriented moral status, therefore, is grounded in sentience 
because it is the feeling pain or pleasure which is the basis of an action’s being 
cruel or kind. And just as animals with greater sentience increase in moral status, 
a human organism, as it increases in sentience may increase in charity-oriented 
moral status. 
Notice how this differs from rights-bearing status. Whereas rights-bearing 
status is a threshold concept so someone with better cognitive faculties is not 
due more rights-bearing status, charity-oriented moral status admits of degrees. 
Accordingly, although I have argued that teleological potential may ground 
justice-oriented moral status, I doubt much can be made of a similar argument 
for charity-oriented moral status. We can understand full moral status, then, as 
possessing both rights-bearing status and the highest degree of charity-oriented 
moral status. 
To return to the titular concern of this paper, infants, fetuses and even 
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zygotes possess rights-bearing status in virtue of their teleological potential. 
Only infants and post-sentient fetuses, however, possess charity-oriented moral 
status, and fetuses increase in charity-oriented moral status as their sense 
capacities develop, thus explaining why infants matter more than zygotes, and 
why fetuses are thought to matter more the more developed they are. Thus, I 
hope to have shown that the intuition that infants are due more moral 
consideration than zygotes can be accommodated alongside acceptance of the 





Thus far, I have argued that there is currently a lack of an account grounding 
the rights-bearing status of infants, developed an account of teleological 
potential to answer this lack and integrated it into a two-fold approach to moral 
status. This final section will consider two potential objections to this account. 
The first potential objection derives from the issue of woman’s rights and is 
directed against the fact that this account affirms fetal rights. In the words of 
Mary Anne Warren, “so long as the fetus remains within the woman’s body, it is 
impossible to treat it as if it were already a person with full and equal moral 
rights, without at the same time treating the woman as if she were something 
less”. 45  The idea is that granting fetuses rights would be a form of 
discrimination threatening the bodily autonomy of women, hence fetuses cannot 
be granted rights and any account that does so is sexist and misguided.46 
Notice, however, that the mere fact that fetal rights may conflict with 
women’s rights is no reason to suppose either that to grant fetal rights is to 
undermine women’s autonomy, or to suppose that they cannot co-exist. 
Commonly accepted rights have the potential to conflict, but this is not normally 
taken to be a valid reason for denying that those rights exist. A’s right to freedom 
of movement may conflict with B’s property rights when A exercises her 
freedom by breaking into B’s house, but that is no reason to deny A’s right to 
freedom, only to judge that B’s property rights should take precedence. Similarly, 
merely accepting fetal rights does not automatically override the rights of the 
mother. The fetus’s moral status is but one factor informing the permissibility of 
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abortion. Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, argues for the permissibility of 
abortion even assuming the fetus has full moral status.47 How the strength of the 
mother’s right to bodily autonomy weighs against the fetus’s right to life is both 
important and interesting, but falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Next, and more importantly for this paper, legal rights are distinct from 
intrinsic rights and rights-bearing status, although ideally the latter should 
inform the former. It seems that on a scale of moral fundamentality, the intrinsic 
moral status of the fetus is metaphysically prior to the permissibility of abortion 
which is prior to the laws of society, and so ideally, legal rights concerning 
abortion should be based on the ethics of abortion which in turn should be built 
upon how the moral status of the fetus weighs against the rights of the mother. 
To reason in reverse from the not uncontroversial positions that fetuses cannot 
be granted legal rights or that abortion must be permissible to the conclusion 
that the fetus therefore cannot intrinsically be a rights-bearer seems a dubious 
argumentative move, especially since it is possible to maintain that the fetus has 
rights-bearing status alongside a permissive view of abortion. 
Next, a second objection to the account may be made based on its 
implications about the severely cognitively disabled. Although the account of 
teleological potential can maintain that the severely cognitively disabled have 
the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities in virtue of their 
humanity, and hence do possess rights-bearing status, it also seems committed to 
implying that the severely cognitively disabled are defective since they lack the 
characteristic rational way for human beings to flourish.  
Perhaps, however, there may be room to resist the idea that the severely 
cognitively disabled are defective human beings while maintaining that for an 
adult human being to lack rationality is a defect. That is, one might allow that 
severe cognitive disability is a defect in the abstract but deny that this 
defectiveness is carried over to the individuals who possess it. As an analogy, 
consider the Japanese art of kintsugi, or “golden joinery”, which involves 
repairing broken pottery with gold-dusted lacquer. Although the breaks are 
objectively flaws, in the finished product they are instead what makes the pot 
unique and beautiful. Moreover, the finished pot is not flawed. Similarly, we 
might allow that severe cognitive disabilities in the abstract are defects, but 
maintain that when instantiated in severely cognitively disabled people, they are 
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part of what makes them who they are, and moreover, such people are not 
defective. 
In order for the kintsugi analogy to work with respect to the severely 
cognitively disabled, however, a coherent story must be told about how the 
cognitively disabled flourish in a normatively human way that is not the typical 
rational way. It is not impossible that such a story could be told: for example, 
citing disability-positive testimony and the wide range of ways in which humans 
can pursue interesting and meaningful lives, Elizabeth Barnes has recently 
argued that physical disability is merely a different rather than a defective way 
of being; although deaf people lack the intrinsic good of hearing, there are also 
other goods in which they participate by virtue of their deafness, such as the 
experience of music through vibrations.48 On this view, deafness is a way of 
experiencing life that cannot be summed up simply by the lack of hearing. If 
such a view can be extended to cognitive disability, the kintsugi analogy might 
be applicable. 
Unfortunately, however, conceiving of severe cognitive disability as merely 
a different way of being seems rather in tension with the account from 
teleological potential. Whereas in the kintsugi example where the repaired 
breaks do not fundamentally undermine the main purpose of the bowl or the cup, 
whether this purpose is functional or purely aesthetic, the lack of rationality in 
an adult human being, on an account that holds that the telos of human beings is 
the rational way, does undermine the main telos. It seems impossible for a way 
that is not rational to achieve the telos, and so impossible for another way of 
flourishing to be as good as the rational way. Conversely, if one instead holds 
that the rational way is but one of the ways of human flourishing, rationality 
loses its special status as the human telos, which the account from teleological 
potential needs to maintain. Ultimately, therefore, the implication that the 
severely cognitively disabled fail to achieve the human telos seems to be a bullet 
the proponent of the account from teleological potential will have to bite. 
Crucially, however, the practical implications of this are muted since even if 
they do not actualize this potential, the severely cognitively disabled do still 
have the teleological potential for sophisticated cognitive capacities that grounds 
rights-bearing status. 
 
                                                     




In conclusion, this paper has developed an account of the moral status of 
infants and fetuses, arguing firstly that teleological potential for sophisticated 
cognitive capacities understood with reference to natural norms can ground their 
rights-bearing status, and secondly that moral status should be understood as 
two-fold and directed at either justice and charity, with infants typically having 
more charity-oriented moral status than fetuses. There may, however, be 
objections to this account deriving from women’s bodily autonomy and the case 
of the severely cognitively disabled, and although I have suggested that 
women’s autonomy need not be incompatible with fetal rights, I am not sure that 
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  In this paper, I make two arguments: 1) There is a solipsistic layer in meaning in life, which I call 
the “heart of meaning in life” (HML). The bearer of the heart of meaning in life is the solipsistic 
being. The heart of meaning in life cannot be compared with anything else whatsoever. 2) The heart 
of meaning in life can be dynamically incorporated into the affirmation of having been born into 
this world, which I call “birth affirmation.” There can be two interpretations of birth affirmation, the 
anti-anti-natalistic interpretation and the possible world interpretation. Birth affirmation can be an 




When you read the sentence “Mandela’s life is more meaningful than your 
life,” what do you think the singular word “your” specifically points to? You 
may say that the word indicates the reader of the sentence. Who, then, is that 
reader? Is it possible to actually name that reader? I would say that it is 
impossible to name the reader because in that sentence the singular word “you” 
points to “the solipsistic being,” the being that does not have a proper name. I 
argue that this solipsistic being is the true and genuine bearer of meaning in life. 
In this paper, I am going to make two arguments: 
 
1) There is a solipsistic layer in the meaning in life, which I call the “heart 
of meaning in life” (HML). The heart of meaning in life cannot be 
compared with anything else whatsoever. 
2) The heart of meaning in life can be dynamically incorporated into the 
affirmation of having been born into this world, which I call “birth 
affirmation.” 
 
This paper is a revised and extended version of my paper “Is Meaning in Life 
Comparable?: From the Viewpoint of ‘The Heart of Meaning in Life,’” which 
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was published in the Journal of Philosophy of Life in 2015. You can see some 
overlapping content between my 2015 paper and this 2019 paper, although the 
contexts in which they appear are slightly different. 
It was Viktor Frankl who implicitly introduced the ideas of the solipsistic 
being and birth affirmation to the discussion of meaning of life. I will first 
explain his idea of the solipsistic being. 
 
2. Frankl and the Solipsistic Being 
 
Frankl writes in his book Man’s Search for Meaning as follows. 
 
What was really needed was a fundamental change in our attitude toward 
life. We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to teach the 
despairing men, that it did not really matter what we expected from life, 
but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about 
the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were 
being questioned by life – daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not 
in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life 
ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its 
problems and to fulfil the tasks which it constantly sets for each 
individual.1 
 
We can see in this text the core message of Frankl’s approach to the question of 
meaning of life. He stresses that we have to stop asking for “the meaning of life 
in general,” and instead realize that we are being questioned by life, daily and 
hourly, about “the meaning of life of ourselves who are actually living here and 
now.”2 Questions about the meaning of life are asked of each individual, by life. 
It is “each individual” who has the responsibility to answer those life 
questions. Frankl gives an important description of the characteristics of “each 
individual” as follows. 
 
When a man finds that it is his destiny to suffer, he will have to accept 
his suffering as his task; his single and unique task. He will have to 
                                                     
1 Frankl (2011), p.62. Italics in the English edition. 
2 In the German edition of this book, Frankl calls this turn “Art kopernikanische Wende” (the way of 
Copernican turn). This term is omitted in the English edition. 
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acknowledge the fact that even in suffering he is unique and alone in the 
universe.3 (Underline by Morioka) 
 
The above sentences of the English edition are not a strict translation of the 
German text. Let us try a word-to-word translation of the underlined part, 
particularly, the meanings of the two words, “unique” and “alone.” 
 
With this destiny full of suffering, so to speak, he stands in the whole 
universe only once and in an incomparable manner. (German: er mit 
diesem leidvollen Schicksal sozusagen im ganzen Kosmos einmalig und 
einzigartig dasteht.4) 
 
Frankl stresses that the individual who has the responsibility for answering the 
life question is the one who stands “only once” and “in an incomparable 
manner” in the whole universe. I interpret Frankl’s words as follows: whatever 
suffering this individual may experience her life occurs only once in this 
universe and can never be repeated in any other way in the future, and the 
manner in which this individual exists in this universe is unique and can never 
be compared with anything whatsoever.5 For Frankl, it is such an individual, 
who stands only once and in an incomparable manner in this universe, who is 
the bearer of meaning in life. Who, then, is this bearer? 
My interpretation is that Frankl comes very close to a kind of solipsism in 
the context of meaning in life.6 Here I am using the word “solipsism” in a 
positive way. Solipsism is normally considered to be the idea that there is only 
one person in the universe who has real inner-consciousness, that is, myself. 
Many people believe that this kind of solipsism is wrong because in that case all 
people other than myself must lack their own inner-consciousness, and this is 
completely absurd. I would like to call this type of solipsism, “the normal 
solipsism.”  
There is another type of solipsism, however, which can shed a special light 
on the fundamental uniqueness of the first person, myself, and emphasize that 
                                                     
3 Frankl (2011), p.63. 
4 Frankl (2011), pp.118-119. 
5 Frankl writes as follows. “No man and no destiny can be compared with any other man or any 
destiny. No situation repeats itself, and each situation calls for a different response.” Frankl (2011), 
pp.62-63. 
6 Frankl does not use the word “solipsism.” 
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the person who has this uniqueness exists absolutely alone, in complete solitude, 
in the whole universe. The number of this person is only one, and no other 
person exists in such a unique way. The key concept of this solipsism is 
aloneness, solitude, or oneness, not the existence of inner-consciousness or 
self-consciousness. Let us call this type of solipsism, “existential solipsism.”7 
Existential solipsism teaches us that although there are many people in the 
universe, there is only one person, or being, that exists in a very special way 
which can never be shared by any other persons. I would like to call this being, 
“the solipsistic being.” Readers might think that every person in our society can 
be, or actually is, this solipsistic being, and thus that there are many solipsistic 
beings here and there. I am the solipsistic being, you are the solipsistic being, 
and she is the solipsistic being. Nevertheless, this reasoning is wrong. If there 
are plural solipsistic beings, they cannot be the solipsistic being because the 
number of the solipsistic being ought to be one, not many. Then, who is 
considered the solipsistic being in the context of existential solipsism? 
Readers might also think that this is a question of indexicals. Yes, the 
question has a strong connection with indexicals, but we cannot reduce the 
central point of the solipsistic being merely to indexical-related problems. For 
example, the indexical “I” can be defined as the pronoun which we use when the 
subject talks about the subject herself recursively. However, this means that any 
person can point to oneself and say “I,” and as a result, there can be many “I”s 
in our society. This clearly shows that the indexical “I” is not the same as the 
solipsistic being because while the former can equally be applied to plural 
persons, the latter can never be applied to plural persons. I would like to stress 
again that the number of the solipsistic being can only be one. 
Readers might then ask me to explain who this solipsistic person actually is 
by using the proper name of a person. This is the crucial point. Interestingly, we 
cannot name who the solipsistic person actually is by using the proper name of a 
person. The author of this paper cannot name the solipsistic being by saying 
“Masahiro Morioka is the solipsistic being.” In the same way, the football player 
Lionel Messi cannot name the solipsistic being by saying “Lionel Messi is the 
solipsistic being.” Then, who is the solipsistic being? 
One way of answering this question is to say that the person who is reading 
                                                     
7 The words “existential solipsism” are a translation of the Japanese term “独在論 dokuzai ron,” 
which can be literally translated as the “solo-existence theory.” I think that the latter would be a more 
appropriate translation, but for the time being, in this paper, I use the former. 
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this sentence just now is the solipsistic being, and in this way, we can directly 
point to the solipsistic being, and the place where this solipsistic being exists. 
The other way of answering this question is to use the second person pronoun 
“you” and say “Hey, reader, YOU are the solipsistic person!” However, using 
such written sentences may contain ambiguity in conveying the true meaning of 
the solipsistic being. In my Japanese book Manga Introduction to Philosophy 




The being at which the finger of this manga character is now pointing is the 
solipsistic being. This shows that the solipsistic being can be directly pointed at 
by a combination of the direction of a fictional finger and the second person 
pronoun “you.” This is the most clear-cut and simple way of pointing to the 
solipsistic being.  
The problem of the solipsistic being has been discussed among Japanese 
philosophers for more than 30 years, since the publication of the Japanese book 
The Metaphysics of “I” (1986) by Hitoshi Nagai. While Nagai seeks to interpret 
the problem of solipsity as that of haecceity and actuality, Morioka argues that 
since the solipsistic being can be directly pointed to in the above ways, the 
crucial point is the function of the second person pronoun in our language. 
Motoyoshi Irifuji argues that the whole picture should be seen from the 
                                                     
8 Morioka (2013b), p.165. 
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perspective of the dynamism of the “relative actuality” and the “absolute 
actuality.”9  
In the following discussion I use the term “the solipsistic being,” but where 
the probability of misunderstanding is considered to be very low I sometimes 
use “I” instead of “the solipsistic being” and make the sentence more readable. 
Let us go back to Frankl’s argument. I believe that what Frankl had in mind 
when he talked about the one who stands “only once” and “in an incomparable 
manner” in the whole universe was the solipsistic being I have discussed in the 
above paragraphs. The bearer of meaning in life is not the indexical “I” in a 
general sense. The bearer of meaning in life is the solipsistic being, which can 
be directly pointed to by a combination of the second person pronoun and the 
experience of being pointed to by a finger.10 
In my 2015 paper, I called the meaning in life that is attained by the 
solipsistic being the “heart of meaning in life” (HML). The heart of meaning in 
life cannot be compared to anything, because since there is only one solipsistic 
being in the universe, there should be no heart of meaning in life that can be 
ascribed to any person other than the solipsistic being. Comparison is impossible 
at the level of the heart of meaning in life. This is the most important feature of 
HML. 
When Frankl writes that “it is impossible to define the meaning of life in a 
general way…. ‘Life’ does not mean something vague, but something very real 
and concrete … No man and no destiny can be compared with any other man or 
any other destiny,”11 he implicitly talks about the heart of meaning in life held 
by the solipsistic being, which I have discussed extensively in this section. 
  
3. Two Kinds of Impossibility in the Comparison of Meaning in Life 
 
Thaddeus Metz argues that the theories of meaning in/of life can be divided 
                                                     
9 The discussion of this topic is now under way mainly in Japanese. You can read a rough sketch of 
Nagai’s argument in Nagai (2007-2010) and (2011-2014). The current discussion can be found in 
Irifuji and Morioka (2019) and subsequent books in the same series to be published in 2020 and 2021. 
I am now writing a paper on this topic in English. If you read Japanese please read the related 
Japanese papers and books that we have written. 
10 A similar perspective can be found in the philosophy of Upanishad, especially, in the famous phrase 
Tat Tvam Asi (You art that). We can also recall Saul Kripke’s “baptism” in his discussion of proper 
names in Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1972). I will discuss these topics in the future English papers. 
11 Frankl (2011), p.62. 
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into three categories: 1) super naturalism, 2) objectivism, and 3) subjectivism.12 
At first sight, existential solipsism looks very similar to subjectivism, but if we 
take a closer look at the difference between existential solipsism and 
subjectivism, it becomes clear that they are completely different from each other. 
We propose existential solipsism as the fourth category of meaning in/of life. 
 
* Super naturalism (1) 
* Naturalism 
* Objectivism (2) 
* Subjectivism (3) 
* Existential solipsism (4) 
 
Super naturalism and objectivism argue that we can say that Person A’s life is 
more meaningful than Person B’s life. In these two categories, the meaning of 
one’s life can be compared with the meanings of others’ lives. On the other hand, 
subjectivism and existential solipsism argue that we cannot say that Person A’s 
life is more meaningful than Person B’s life. In subjectivism and existential 
solipsism, the meaning of one’s life cannot be compared with the meanings of 
others’ lives, but interestingly, the reason they cannot be compared is completely 
different. 
Subjectivism thinks that the meaning of one’s life can only been determined 
by that particular person herself, and other people outside her cannot determine 
the meaning of her life, thus the comparison between the meaning of one’s life 
and the meanings of other lives should be impossible. The meaning of Person 
A’s life can only be determined by Person A, the meaning of Person B’s life can 
only be determined by Person B, and so on. 
Existential solipsism does not think so, however. Existential solipsism 
argues that the heart of meaning in life, which is the only meaningful concept of 
meaning in life for existential solipsism, can only be determined by the 
solipsistic being itself. We have already discussed who this solipsistic being is. 
The number of the solipsistic being is only one. Therefore, from the perspective 
of existential solipsism, the only thing that can be meaningfully discussed in the 
context of meaning in life is the heart of meaning in life of the solipsistic being, 
and anything other than that cannot be meaningfully discussed. The heart of 
                                                     
12 Metz (2013). 
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meaning in the life of Person A cannot be meaningfully discussed, and the heart 
of meaning in the life of Person B cannot be meaningfully discussed. Only the 
heart of meaning in life of the solipsistic being can be meaningfully discussed. 
This is why the comparison between two or more people at the level of HML is 
logically impossible.  
Imagine Hitler’s life. Super naturalism and objectivism argue that we can 
talk about the meaning of Hitler’s life objectively, and can compare it with, say, 
the meaning of Mandela’s life. Subjectivism does not think so. According to 
subjectivism, we can talk about the meaning of Hitler’s life, and for example, we 
may even say that Hitler’s life might have been meaningful because he believed 
that he successfully flourished in his life in his own way until his last day. 
However, it is Hitler himself who can determine whether or not his life was 
actually meaningful. We cannot determine the meaningfulness of Hitler’s life 
objectively from the outside. 
Existential solipsism does not think so. According to existential solipsism, 
the concept of “the heart of meaning in life of Hitler” does not make any sense 
because the solipsistic being, which is the bearer of HML, cannot be pointed to 
by the name of a proper person, such as Hitler. The heart of meaning in life of 
Hitler does not make sense from the beginning, hence it cannot be compared 
with anything at all. There is no such thing as someone else’s HML. HML is 
always the solipsistic being’s HML.13 
We have so far discussed who the bearer of meaning in life is, and have 
discovered that the heart of meaning in life can only be held by the solipsistic 
being. In other words, we can say that there is a layer of existential solipsism in 
the realm of meaning in life, and this layer is distinguished from other layers, 
such as the subjectivist layer and the objectivist layer, and it should be shed a 
special light on in the discussion of meaning in/of life. 
Before going on to the next section, I would like to stress that the above 
discussion has involved the “bearer” of meaning in life, not the “content” of 
meaning in life. When thinking about the content of meaning in life, we should 
take the importance of human relationships into account and leave the negative 
solipsistic bias that the word solipsism may lure us into. 
 
                                                     
13 You may wonder, “Wasn’t Hitler a solipsistic being when he was alive?” I would answer this 
question negatively because the solipsistic being cannot be pointed to using the proper name of a 
person. 
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4. Meaning in Life and “Birth Affirmation” 
 
Let us move on to a discussion of the content of the heart of meaning in life. 
Here I would like to convert the meaning question to the question of affirmation, 
and propose regarding the question of meaning in life as a question of the 
possibility of “birth affirmation.” 
Frankl’s book, again, gives us a clue about how to think deeply about this 
topic. The original German title of Man’s Search for Meaning is “…trozdem Ja 
zum Leben sagen,” which can be translated as “Nevertheless Say(ing) Yes to 
One’s Life.” This phrase eloquently illustrates Frankl’s understanding of the 
meaning of the meaning of life. According to Frankl, we are being questioned by 
life, daily and hourly, about the meaning of our own life, we have a 
responsibility to answer that question, and “saying yes to one’s life” can be the 
most simple and fundamental answer to that question. Here we can see Frankl’s 
idea that the meaning of the meaning of life can be understood as the affirmation 
of one’s life, that is, saying yes to one’s life. In this idea we can also hear the 
resonance of Nietzsche’s concept, the affirmation of life in the form of eternal 
recurrence. Encouraged by Frankl, I would like to further develop his 
life-affirmation philosophy into a new way of interpreting the meaning of the 
meaning of life. 
I would like to call this kind of approach, an “affirmation-based approach to 
the meaning in life.” I have long developed my own affirmation-based approach, 
the theory of birth affirmation, which is one of the affirmation-based approaches 
to the meaning in life, extensively in Japanese papers. I provide a summary of 
the main argument of the theory of birth affirmation in the following 
paragraphs.14 
From my perspective, what gives the solipsistic being the heart of meaning 
in life is “the affirmation of the whole life” of the solipsistic being. What, then, 
does the affirmation of the whole life mean? It does not mean that the solipsistic 
being can affirm every life event it has experienced. Instead, it means that the 
solipsistic being can affirm what it has experienced up until the present as a 
whole even if there have been particular events that cannot be affirmed at all. 
This is my interpretation of the affirmation of the whole life. 
Looking back on our lives, we find a number of life events to which we 
                                                     
14 I will write papers on birth affirmation in more detail in English in the near future. 
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cannot say yes, but this does not necessarily mean that our lives cannot be 
affirmed as a whole. Affirming a life as a whole means to affirm a life that 
contains, as its parts, many life events that cannot be affirmed. Let us take a 
specific example. The other day, one of my friends sent me an email saying that 
his most beloved friend had killed herself. He fell into despair and could not find 
a way to escape from this predicament. I did not know how to cope with this 
difficult situation either, and so I wrote to him to say that I really would like him 
to survive this difficult period. I wrote, “Of course, this painful life event cannot 
be affirmed at all, but if you can survive this painful period, it becomes logically 
possible in the future that you can look back on your life as a whole and come to 
think of it as something that can be affirmed from the bottom of your heart, 
although this particular life event itself will remain one that can never be 
affirmed by you.” This way of thinking is an example of separating particular 
life events from one’s life as a whole. I do not think that this kind of separation 
is always possible, especially in the case of harsh experiences. I am not such an 
optimist and I do not know how to achieve this separation effectively. My point 
is to show that this separation is logically possible, and the affirmation of life as 
a whole is logically possible, whatever predicament we may experience in our 
lives. I believe that in many cases a life that is affirmed as a whole contains 
some life events that cannot be affirmed as its parts.15 To help people realize 
this logical structure is the role of philosophy, and to discover a concrete way to 
actually make this separation is the role of psychology. This is a place where 
philosophy and psychology can cooperate. 
The role of philosophy in the theory of birth affirmation is: 1) to show that 
birth affirmation is logically possible in all cases, 2) to give a detailed analysis 
of the concept of birth affirmation, 3) to make clear the similarities and 
differences with other related concepts such as self-affirmation and 
life-affirmation, and 4) to make clear the social and cultural aspects of birth 
affirmation. 
Let us think about the concept of “the whole life” again. Usually, the whole 
life means the whole period of time from the beginning of life (birth) to the end 
of life (death). This means that the affirmation of the whole life is possible only 
at the final end of one’s life, that is, at the moment of one’s death. Generally 
speaking, this is not a strange idea. Many people easily understand a sentence 
                                                     
15 This point needs further detailed scrutiny. I have discussed it in my Japanese papers. 
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such as “When she faced death, she looked back over her whole life and 
affirmed it from the bottom of her heart” however, the idea that in order to 
affirm the whole life we have to wait a long time for the time of death sounds 
very strange to me.16 
My understanding of the concept of the whole life is completely different 
from the one above. I do not think that the whole life is the objective period of 
time that is determined by its beginning and its end. Roughly speaking, the 
whole life is the life that comes up to my mind when I try to look back at all my 
life events from here and now into the past, from the inside. Speaking more 
precisely, the whole life is a subjective picture that is constructed by the 
elements which come up in the solipsistic being’s mind when the solipsistic 
being tries to look back at all the past experiences of its actual life. 
Since the whole life is a subjective picture, every time the solipsistic being 
looks back on its past experiences, its whole life appears differently in its eyes. 
The contents of the whole life which was looked back on one month ago and 
that which was looked back on yesterday are not the same, even in the 
overlapping period, that is, the period before one month. 
The important thing is that when the solipsistic being affirms its life, what 
the solipsistic being affirms is this subjective whole life, as discussed above. 
This further implies that affirming the whole life in this sense is considered 
equal to affirming the birth of the solipsistic being into the world. I call this the 
“birth affirmation.” Birth affirmation is the judgement, made by the solipsistic 
being, that “I am glad that I have been born.” Please note that this is not “I am 
glad that you have been born” which parents sometimes say to their child. Birth 
affirmation means that “I am glad that I have been born.” 
The theory of birth affirmation is not that which claims that every life has 
already been affirmed or that every life should be affirmed. It is the theory 
which claims that the life of the solipsistic being can be affirmed as a whole 
every time when it looks back on its life, until the last minute of its end. 
Then, what is “affirmation”? What does it mean to affirm one’s life? My 
answer to these questions is as follows.17 
Birth affirmation means either of the two following propositions. 
 
                                                     
16 There are many discussions on the whole life and the part life problem in the philosophy of 
meaning in life. See Metz (2013), pp.37-58. 
17 I have discussed this topic extensively in my Japanese papers. 
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1) Never to think, at the bottom of my heart, that it would have been 
better not to have been born. (Anti-anti-natalistic interpretation) 
2) Even if there were a possible world in which my ideal was realized or 
my grave sufferings were resolved, never to think that, at the bottom of 
my heart, that it would have been better to have been born to that 
possible world. (Possible world interpretation) 
 
The first proposition is the complete negation of anti-natalism, which has been 
advocated since ancient times and recently fervently supported by David Benatar. 
I call this proposition the “anti-anti-natalistic interpretation” of birth affirmation. 
(I discuss anti-natalism in the next section.) The second proposition can be 
interpreted as Morioka’s version of Nietzsche’s amor fati. Nietzsche talks about 
the concept of amor fati in Ecce Homo as follows. “My formula for greatness in 
a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, 
not backward, not in all eternity.”18 Nietzsche is the first advocate of the second 
proposition of birth affirmation. I call this proposition the “possible world 
interpretation” of birth affirmation. There is a close connection between these 
two propositions, and I have much to say about their characteristics, but there is 
not enough space for this discussion. I have to move on to the next topic here. 
As I said before, according to the theory of birth affirmation, the whole life 
is a subjective picture. This means that birth affirmation is also a subjective 
affirmation made by the solipsistic being.19 This shows that the theory of birth 
affirmation may be a variation of narrative approaches to meaning in/of life. 
This further shows that the theory of birth affirmation shares a certain risk with 
narrative approaches in general, that is to say, the risk of making self-righteous 
affirmative stories and giving the solipsistic being a narcissistic interpretation of 
an affirmed life. Of course, it is very hard to determine which story is 
narcissistic and which is not, however, if a story is narcissistic, that story cannot 
have the power to enrich the human relationship between the solipsistic being 
and its significant others. A birth affirmation made by the solipsistic being 
should thus be placed under a never ending process of inner examination until 
the last day of its life. (I think that this is what Socrates had in mind when he 
                                                     
18 Nietzsche (1967, 2000), p.714. Original German is “Meine Formel für die Grösse am Menschen ist 
amor fati: dass man Nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht.” 
19 I am still wondering which words we should use, “subjective affirmation” or “solipsistic 
affirmation.” 
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used the words “examined life.”) 
 
5. Anti-Natalism and Birth Affirmation 
 
The theory of birth affirmation seems to be in direct opposition to 
anti-natalism. (I sometimes call anti-natalism birth negation.) There have been 
many anti-natalist theories in human history, for example those by Sophokles in 
ancient Greece and Arthur Schopenhauer in the 19th century Germany, and the 
latest version of anti-natalism is David Benatar’s theory of “better never to have 
been.” He argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and therefore, the 
birth of sentient beings should have been avoided. According to his theory, any 
life that contains at least a very small drop of pain is logically worse than not 
having been born, and the badness of this life can never be compensated at all, 
no matter how much pleasure may be poured into life before and after the time 
of that tiny pain. 
On the one hand, I do not think his argument is logically correct. Firstly, his 
premise that “the presence of pain is bad” is wrong even if that pain does not 
lead to future pleasure. For me, the presence of some bearable pain itself is not 
bad at all, and I do not think that this is a fundamentally flawed way of thinking. 
If this premise is wrong, every following argument by Benatar should be 
regarded as wrong, including his conclusion, “coming into existence is always a 
harm.” Secondly, his argument about counterfactual conditionals has a grave 
problem when he tries to compare the situation in which a sentient being has 
been born and the situation in which such thing has never occurred. He 
compares what cannot be compared. (I promise that I will discuss the latter 
problem in detail in my future paper.) 
On the other hand, I really appreciate his book Better Never to Have Been 
because it succeeded in letting the eyes of analytic philosophers turn to the 
meaning of having been born, and to philosophical issues concerning the 
meaning of life in general.  
Although I have advocated the theory of birth affirmation, it is also true that 
sometimes, and even now, I am deeply trapped in the thought of birth negation, 
that it is better never to have been. The reason I have advocated birth affirmation 
is that birth negation is one of the strongest basso continuo of my life and I 
really yearn to overcome it. Sometimes I think that the world in which Morioka 
had never been born would have been a better world, considering the pain and 
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suffering I have caused to my beloved ones. 
At the same time, I cannot help thinking that if I had not been born at all, the 
happiness and enjoyment that my beloved ones have experienced with me would 
not have existed at all in this world. Isn’t it insulting and immoral to wish such a 
thing on my beloved ones, who have shared the happiness and sorrow of life 
with me (even if it is a wish that cannot come true)? 
However fervently I might wish, it is totally impossible to go back to the 
time of my birth and erase it from this world. Logically speaking, the wish of 
anti-natalists cannot be fulfilled. It is destined to be frustrated. Hence, the only 
thing that remains for the solipsistic being is to continue living its life toward the 
future, and to seek a way to attain the birth affirmation of the whole life. A birth 
affirmation might not take place, but it might take place, and the latter is not 
logically impossible. This is why surviving is strongly encouraged even when 
the solipsistic being groans with heartbreaking pain and suffering. 
Hearing the words “birth affirmation of the solipsistic being,” you may think 
that it is attainable only through the solipsistic being’s struggle, without any 
support from surrounding people, but in many cases this is wrong. Support from 
surrounding people is very important for birth affirmation. Birth affirmation also 
contains, more or less, the affirmative attitudes of beloved ones toward their 
own lives, and those of other unknown people toward themselves. The 
affirmative attitudes of other people toward their lives has a positive influence 
on the birth affirmation of the solipsistic being, because the way that the 
solipsistic being looks at its own life is closely connected with how other people 
look at their lives. This is the place where the theory of birth affirmation meets 
ethics. 
In the above paragraph, I used the words “the affirmative attitudes of 
beloved ones toward their own lives.” This is because the words “birth 
affirmation” can only be applied, strictly speaking, to the solipsistic being. We 
should not use “birth affirmation” in the case of other people. At first, this way 
of thinking sounds very strange, but this is the logical conclusion of the theory 
of birth affirmation and existential solipsism. 
When a person says, “I have had a birth affirmation!” how then should I 
interpret her words? It is clear that the person in question is not the solipsistic 
being, hence, her words “I have had a birth affirmation!” are wrong. Her words 
are not senseless, however. If I interpret her words as “I have finally got an 
affirmative attitude toward my whole life! I have come to be able to say yes to 
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my whole life!,” then her words make sense without any ambiguity.  
Before closing this paper, let me make a final comment on birth affirmation 
and the value of life. The solipsistic being may not be able to attain a birth 
affirmation in any instances of its entire life, however, even such a case does not 
mean that the whole life of the solipsistic being is of lower value than other 
people’s affirmed lives. The value of the life of the solipsistic being cannot be 
compared, in essence, to the value of any other person’s life, and it cannot be 
compared with any hypothetical, counterfactual lives of the solipsistic being 
itself because the solipsistic being has no hypothetical, counterfactual variants in 
this universe.  
In this paper, I have illustrated the essence of a new approach, “the 
solipsistic and affirmation-based approach to meaning in life.” I am going to 
broaden this approach to make a systematic philosophical framework called “the 
philosophy of birth affirmation.” 
 
 
* This paper was first presented at the First International Conference on Philosophy and 
Meaning in Life, which was held at Hokkaido University, Japan, on August 20th, 2018. 
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